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1. Introduction: Monsters, Evil and Frankenstein in Popular Culture 
  
Throughout the history of mankind, malevolent monsters and evil beings have fascinated and 
disturbed us. Folklore, literature and cinema offer us a wide variety of villains, both intriguing 
and appalling. Sometimes evil is presented in the form of a beast, a big bad wolf or a terrifying 
troll (such as in the classic stories The Three Little Pigs & The Big Bad Wolf or Three Billy 
Goats Gruff), sometimes as a human being who disregards the moral codes of gods and men 
(such as Patrick Bateman in Bret Easton Ellis’ novel American Psycho {1991}). As our 
understanding of the world and its creatures expands, so does our perception of evil, 
monstrosity and cruelty – both in the real world and in the world of arts. It is becoming more 
and more clear that although human beings are drawn to straightforward categorizations, the 
distinction between good and evil is rarely straightforward. Strict categorizations might lead to 
cruelty against a presumed evildoer (Taylor 12–13) which is one reason why it is necessary for 
human beings to be able to adjust their belief systems. Cinema and literature might help in 
practicing this adjustment with help from modern heroes and villains such as Shrek from the 
movie franchise of the same name (2001) or Dexter Morgan from Jeff Lindsay’s book series 
(2004–2015) turned into a TV-series. Such characters challenge our traditional views on 
monstrosity and evil. 
Although there currently exists a wide spectrum of heroes and villains in literature and 
cinema, the most classic monsters are those who are wholly evil both inside and out. Examples 
of these include supernatural villains such as Grendel from Beowulf, Sauron from The Lord of 
the Rings (1954–1955), Freddy Krueger from the horror franchise A Nightmare on Elm Street 
(1984) and the Devil from various works of literature and cinema. Their urge towards 
destruction cannot be explained or justified. They cannot be influenced or persuaded to be 
anything else but monsters. Such evil is terrifying and even entertaining but does not offer 
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much intellectual challenge. The minds of the reader or the moviegoer are more affected and 
their views challenged when the dichotomy between good and evil, monsters and humans, is 
less obvious (see Hills 2005; Taylor 2009). 
Characters who are intimidating or seemingly horrendous because of appearance or 
other traits are sometimes given the surprising status of a hero. The ugly green ogre from the 
movie franchise Shrek might be hunted with torches and pitchforks but nevertheless acts as a 
hero. Quasimodo from Victor Hugo’s The Hunchback of Notre Dame (1831) or even Marvel 
characters such as The Thing and The Incredible Hulk appear monstrous and terrifying but 
challenge our traditional tendency towards the fear of the different and unattractive: a 
monstrous looking being can also be the protagonist through persona and actions.  
In many narratives a hitherto evil villain is either revealed to be a misunderstood hero 
or turns into a hero figure. Perhaps the best-known example of a villain turning good is the 
terrifying Darth Vader who, to save his son from a horrible death, turns against the evil Emperor 
in Star Wars: Episode VI – The Return of the Jedi (1983). Characters who are revealed to be 
good despite their intimidating appearance or actions include Sirius Black and Severus Snape 
from the Harry Potter series (1997–2007), Te Ka from the Disney picture Vaiana (2016) and 
several characters in movies by Hayao Miyazaki. Spin-off movies and novels justifying the 
actions of famous villains have also become increasingly popular. Examples of this include 
Gregory Maguire’s novel (1995) turned Broadway musical Wicked (2003) which gives the 
antagonist originally known from The Wonderful Wizard of Oz (1900) a voice of her own. A 
similar example is found in the movie Maleficent (2015) in which the antagonist originally 
known from Sleeping Beauty (1959) is revealed to be a secret hero. The shift from monstrous 
to good might adjust our views on good and evil, monsters and humans, in an entertaining and 
uplifting way. 
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As the concepts of monstrosity and evil have shifted from vampires, werewolves and 
the like towards psychological abnormalities, human villains are becoming increasingly 
recurring characters in fiction (see Hills 2005). Social psychologist Roy F. Baumeister claims 
that the shift from supernatural monsters to human villains (who might initially appear 
charismatic and amiable but nevertheless commit horrendous acts of evil) began with Alfred 
Hitchcock’s Psycho in 1960 (64). In the fantasy genre, the best-known example of a seemingly 
harmless but supremely evil human villain might be Tom Riddle from the Harry Potter saga 
who is at first described as a handsome and charismatic young man but whose later appearance 
as the red-eyed and noseless Lord Voldemort is the ultimate result of his sins. Oscar Wilde's 
famous novel The Picture of Dorian Gray (1890) includes a similar example although it is 
Dorian’s portrait which displays the corruptive effects of his crimes while Dorian himself 
remains beautiful. At times evil does not corrupt one’s appearance but is evoked by disability. 
A wide variety of movies depict villains who suffer from a disability somehow connected to 
their predilection for evil acts (Nayar 142). Examples of this include the movies Speed (1994), 
Enter the Dragon (1973), I Know What You Did Last Summer (1997), Goldfinger (1964) 
(Nayar 142) and Skyfall (2012). 
However, evil is not necessarily visible in one’s appearance although it is traditionally 
associated with the witch’s nose, red eyes, horns, fangs, etc. Examples of hidden monstrosity 
include the Manhattan-based investment banker and serial killer Patrick Bateman from Bret 
Easton Ellis’ novel American Psycho (1991) and the intelligent and charismatic psychiatrist 
Hannibal Lecter featured in four different novels by Thomas Harris. An evil supervillain such 
as Sauron from The Lord of the Rings is easy to recognize as a monster (Taylor 215) but 
Bateman, Lecter and the like pose an undetected threat. It is also a common plot twist to have 
a sidekick or a friend revealed to be either the antagonist or their assistant. The betrayal makes 
the friend’s monstrousness even more terrifying as the corruptive effect of evil exists right 
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beside the protagonist – held close and trusted. Examples of this include Professor Quirrell and 
the pet rat Scabbers from the Harry Potter series, Prince Hans from Disney’s Frozen (2013) 
and Saruman the White from Lord of the Rings.  
Cinema and literature have also depicted famous antagonists from historical events 
placing Adolf Hitler, Amon Goeth and Idi Amin as semi-fictional characters (in the movies 
The Downfall {2004}, Schindler’s List {1993} and The Last King of Scotland {2006}, 
respectively). Such men have the appearance of an average human being but also the capacity 
to commit horrific crimes. This duality reminds the reader or the moviegoer of the disturbing 
fact that evil is not exclusive to fiction. Herein lies the true horror of contemporary monstrosity: 
it is more difficult to defend oneself against undetected evil. The shift from presumably good 
to deceitful monstrousness might adjust our views while evoking fear and upset. 
Traditional themes, such as monstrosity and evil, can be questioned within a work itself 
or by means of a critical reading of a text, for example via a feminist (see Gilbert 2006) or a 
postcolonial perspective. Sometimes the audiences can disagree with an author or a filmmaker 
about the content of their work. Many feminist readings have criticized the romantic advances 
of, for example, Han Solo and Edward Cullen in the Star Wars and Twilight (2005–2008) 
franchises (Cocca 2016; Larsson 2011). While the determined advances of these characters 
towards the reluctant or helpless females have been considered romantic by many viewers, 
some might argue that Solo forcing a kiss on Leia (Cocca 103) or Cullen breaking into Bella’s 
bedroom to watch her sleep (Larsson 151) is harassment rather than romantic gestures. It could 
be argued that the famous stairwell scene in the film Gone with the Wind (1939) represents a 
type of domestic abuse rather than a manifestation of epic love.  
Nonetheless, a critical reading does not always contradict the work. Sometimes the 
author or filmmaker leaves room for multiple interpretations. Tove Jansson, for example,  
depicts the character Groke (Mörkö/Mårran) as a terrifying ice monster avoided by the warm 
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and fun loving Moomin family. The character evokes fear or pity depending on the reader. She 
is either a malevolent force harassing the family or a lonely creature longing for 
companionship. A presumed villain, such as Groke, might receive absolution only several years 
after the work has been published. Furthermore, the actions of a hero (such as Han Solo, 
Edward Cullen or Rhett Butler from Gone with the Wind) might be questioned by critical 
reassessment after years of appreciation. The reassessment of values is a continuous process 
that relates both to critical and aesthetic judgments but also to values in society at large. 
 In Mary Shelley’s groundbreaking novel Frankenstein, published in 1818, it is the 
character of “the monster” who has gained understanding, if not absolution, by means of a close 
reading after decades of evoking fear and disgust among critics. Similar to Tove Jansson’s 
Groke, Mary Shelley’s nameless creature can be interpreted simply as a monster haunting and 
tormenting the protagonist or as a sympathetic creature with his own motives, needs and 
emotions. Although the critical community is beginning to see the creature as a victim,1 
consumers of popular culture might still perceive him as a terrifying and ugly monster – despite 
the fact that he belongs more accurately to the same category of heroes and villains as Severus 
Snape, the misunderstood Miyazaki characters or Darth Vader do. The secondary aim of this 
thesis is to deepen this absolution the creature has gained over the past decades through a close 
reading of Frankenstein.  
However, the secondary aim cannot be reached by concentrating on the creature. It is 
necessary to focus on the agency and motives of the creator, Victor Frankenstein: the secret 
monster who resembles Hannibal Lecter, Tom Riddle and Edward Cullen through his 
undetected crimes. The character of Victor Frankenstein is usually analysed only in relation to 
his creature either as the oppressed or the oppressor (e.g. Botting, Brooks, Clark, Feder, Ryan). 
                                               
1 For example, Melanie Friese and Anna E. Clark’s interpretations, as opposed to those of Fred Botting and 
Helena Feder. 
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However, Victor Frankenstein is a strong individual character before and after the creation of 
his “monster” and should be examined carefully as such:  an individual character. The primary 
aim of this study is to emphasize the monstrosity and evil within the creator not merely as a 
response to his creature’s crimes but as an autonomous factor. As many critics, such as Melanie 
Friese and Anna E. Clark, have argued that the creature might not be the true villain in Shelley’s 
novel, the goal of this thesis is to emphasize why Victor Frankenstein is – although he is not 
directly revealed to be a secret monster within a text as Lecter and Riddle are but by means of 
a critical reading. 
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2. Theoretical Background 
 2.1. Earlier Studies on Frankenstein 
 
After two hundred years since Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein, or the Modern Prometheus was 
originally published, discourse on the novel “continues to reach staggering proportions” 
(Feder 56). The website of the Department of English in University of Pennsylvania alone 
offers more than two hundred academic articles on Frankenstein ranging from the monster’s 
vegetarian diet to presentations of feminism in the novel’s subplots. Recurring study questions 
and declarations revolving around Shelley’s novel concern monstrosity, monstrousness and 
evil. What qualities make a monster, what defines evil? Is Frankenstein’s creature a demon or 
a doppelgänger of his creator or perhaps an innocent soul who has inevitably turned to evil? 
How does Shelley present monstrosity and evil in her novel and what does this presentation 
suggest about our culture and society, even about human beings in general? 
Many critical readings of Frankenstein study the character of Victor Frankenstein's 
creation, “the monster”, as a terrifying antagonist and nonhuman agent. Victor Frankenstein 
has been traditionally perceived as the victim (see for example, Foust 1980). These readings 
consider the creature’s monstrosity as a fact; an allegory supporting their thesis. Helena Feder, 
for example, calls the character a “moral stain” who “embodies death and destruction both as 
an example of and corrective to the arrogance of Western culture” (64). R. E. Foust describes 
the character as a malevolent creature and thus a textbook example of a fantasy antagonist 
who, as a “repressed chthonic doppelgänger”, haunts and masters his creator, the innocent 
young Frankenstein (para. 14). A monster sometimes serves as a “screen onto which all 
anxieties and fears of the community are projected” (Nayar 142). Many researchers, such as 
Fred Botting (who has written that the monster deliberately challenges the laws of humanity 
and nature), Paul Cantor, Nancy Yousef and John Clubbe tend to interpret the creature as a 
9 
 
metaphor for something disturbing or fundamentally unacceptable – and Victor Frankenstein 
as the human counterpart and reactor. Feder, for example, states in her essay (2010) that there 
are plenty of Marxist analyses of the novel on how the creature's monstrosity depicts the 
problems of the modern era and the fears humans have about society and even themselves. 
This might explain why the concept of “the monster’s” unnatural birth has become a political 
metaphor: the terrorist group ISIS has been referred to as the Frankenstein’s monster of the 
Middle East (Vallely 2014), and even president Donald Trump has been called the 
Frankenstein monster of American politics (Kludt 2016). 
Although Frankenstein's creature has traditionally been perceived as a force challenging 
human laws, human agency and human uniqueness (Feder 2010), more modern views regard 
the monster as a victim, not the evil doppelgänger, of Victor Frankenstein. These 
interpretations suggest that the creature is both monstrous in his appearance and acts of crime 
and still a sympathetic character: an antagonist with comprehensible motives. In his study on 
Frankenstein, Botting has stated that it is radical and revolutionary to challenge conservative 
arguments and “reconstruct the monster-makers as monsters” (para. 8). However, opposite 
views do exist. Peter Brooks, for example, calls the creation of “the monster” the result of 
Frankenstein's “illicit curiosity" (para. 30). According to Canguilhem and his studies on 
monstrosity, monstrous deformity has been interpreted as a sign of conscious act of defiance, 
but the birth of a monster is not the crime of the monster but that of its creator (Wright 20). 
Robert M. Ryan states that in the 1970's “a general reassessment of the novel's meaning” 
began to surface, especially in the fields of feminism and psychoanalysis (para. 1). This new 
interpretation is more sympathetic to the creature. Many researchers, such as Leslie 
Tannenbaum in 1977 (Ryan 1988) have studied the concepts of production and human 
attempts to step into the Creator’s shoes; instead of being an active force of destruction, the 
character of “the monster” stands here as a cautionary example of the excessive power of 
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science and unnatural production, making Victor Frankenstein the true culprit. Sandra Gilbert 
and Susan Gubar have stated that in the overlapping themes of Frankenstein and John Milton’s 
Paradise Lost, Victor Frankenstein represents the satanic vice and Eve-like fall of illicit 
curiosity (233). Besides in the fields of evil and monstrosity, the creature has received 
sympathetic remarks in other areas of study. Anna E. Clark, for example, has studied the 
narrative significance of the monster’s monologues and the sympathetic reactions they 
provide (2014). Robert M. Ryan has studied the sincere religiousness of the monster compared 
to the spiritual indifference of Victor Frankenstein, making the monster more human than his 
creator (1988). It is evident that the traditional dichotomy between an evil monster and an 
innocent victim has been replaced by many new perspectives in critical readings of Shelley’s 
Frankenstein. 
 
2.2. A Very Brief Introduction to Monstrosity and Evil 
2.2.1. Monstrosity 
 
In order to understand the monstrosity and evil in Shelley’s novel one needs to understand the 
concepts in general. Unlike the critical readings of Frankenstein, the fields studying 
monstrosity in philosophy, sociology and visual culture, for example, remain somewhat 
unanimous in their definitions. The word “monster” is derived from the verb monere, to warn, 
in several languages such as French, Anglo-Norman languages, classical Latin, Italian, Spanish 
and Portuguese and thus draws attention to the visible, dangerous overlapping of human and 
animal, human and non-human (Boon 33). In Frankenstein, this overlapping is visible in the 
creature’s body representing the broken barrier between the living and the dead. Researchers 
studying the aspects of monstrosity agree that as early as in Aristotelian times monstrosity has 
been considered a visible crime against nature and its order – usually in the body of a living 
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creature (Wright 31). Traditional monsters have been depicted as hybrids of different species, 
creatures born with additional or lacking limbs or (as in the case of Frankenstein’s creature) 
superhuman proportions (Wright 5). The most terrifying monstrous creatures were human-
animal hybrids breaking the law of human uniqueness (Wright 20).   
Naturally, the concept of monstrosity relies on the constructed norms of “us” and 
“Others”, “our way” and the “abnormal”, making the approach very ethnocentric (Wright 15). 
According to Wright, Western civilizations have traditionally considered wild men, people 
representing “abnormal” body types (48), women and different races (such as the Pygmies 
{15}, Mongolians or Ethiopians {33}) “sub-human”, “quasi-human” or “not quite human”, at 
least compared to the civilized white male. This is why the idea of monstrosity often collides 
with racism: monstrosity does not only challenge the image of the human body but also the 
values and lifestyles of different societies. Canguilhem has stated that “monstrosity is never an 
intrinsic quality – it is a narrative imposed on certain appearances or behaviors at particular 
times in a specific social context” (qtd. in Wright 3). Nayar claims in a posthumanist approach 
that monster studies examine structural exclusion which marginalizes and demonizes certain 
races as beastly (115). Disability studies also bear much similarity to monster studies: besides 
different races and cultures, different kinds of body types and mental disorders that do not fit 
the prevalent perception of normal have been considered monstrous and people affected by 
them have been categorized as “freaks”, “non-humans” or “inhuman” (Nayar 111). A monster 
would thus mean “a fearsome, incomprehensible Other”. 
Primarily, the fear of monstrosity is that of the unknown and unintelligible. The truly 
monstrous remains a mystery and cannot be understood (Wright 18). Nayar states that monsters 
are “expressions of cultural anxieties about – and demonization of – forms of life” (114). The 
incomprehensible is found monstrous because it either does not fit into established categories 
(such as human, animal, male, female) or would fit into several and contradicting ones (Nayar 
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114). Hence, as mystery is replaced with knowledge and established categories are widened, 
the aspect of monstrousness disappears or, at least, diminishes. As science began to evolve 
rapidly in the late 19th century so did the understanding towards abnormal creatures and their 
origins as well as foreign cultures and customs (Wright 104). Monstrosity shifted, gradually 
and slowly, to be understood as a psychological quality: monsters are not necessarily creatures 
disturbing in appearance, like Frankenstein’s creature is, but in behavior, such as Victor 
Frankenstein: the scientist who dissects and combines corpses into a massive frame, reanimates 
life to serve his own ambition and then repeatedly abandons his creation.  
As the current definition of monstrosity is decreasingly associated as a physical 
attribute instead of a behavioral or psychological abnormality, it is the inability to recognize 
human monsters by their appearance or narration that now makes them fearsome (Wright 148). 
In her study, Wright lists Ted Bundy, the American serial killer, and Anders Breivik, the 
Norwegian far-right terrorist, as modern monsters whose motives and evolving into murderers 
are still difficult to comprehend. This is especially so in the case of Ted Bundy who appeared 
to be a very normal, handsome and successful middle-class American. Somewhat similar is the 
character of Victor Frankenstein: a young, upper-class European man who has an 
overwhelming desire for illicit actions along with a fearsomely disdainful attitude towards 
established norms. Because of the inability to understand such modern monsters, some scholars 
have questioned the limitations of psychiatric diagnoses currently available. Baron Cohen, for 
example, has criticized the limited amount of mental disorder descriptions which focus on lack 
of empathy because a violent person can in modern standards be classified as “psychologically 
normal” (158). Such is the case with, for example, Anders Breivik. Until such mental disorder 
descriptions are formed, if they ever will be, human monsters remain mysterious beasts. 
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2.2.2. Evil 
 
Unlike monstrosity, which relies heavily on constructed norms, evil is not a concept that has 
been much affected by scientific revelations. Human response to evil remains somewhat 
unchanged despite new psychological discoveries. Evil and cruelty seem to be judged similarly 
in different cultures as there exists some anthropological evidence of a universal moral code 
(Taylor 5). Kathleen Taylor compares universal grammar, such as the existence of nouns and 
verbs, to universal moral code, such as the existence of ideas of impurity, blameworthy and 
responsibility (37).  
However, compared to the concept of monstrosity, the concept of evil poses a far more 
complicated problem in, for example, theology, philosophy, psychology and criminology 
because of two reasons. First, unlike with monstrosity, the motivations behind evil deeds are 
not entirely beyond comprehension (Baumeister 8). This means that because evildoers are not 
part of a different monstrous race there lies a less distinct dichotomy between “the righteous” 
and “the evildoers” than between “normal” and “monstrous”. This makes evil an 
uncomfortably applicable attribute to every human being (even to a charming young genius 
such as Victor Frankenstein). Secondly, the most argued debate on evil must still be that of the 
broadness of the term: is evil categorized as an almost supernatural phenomenon that emerges 
only rarely (in events such as the genocides in Nazi Germany and Rwanda) or is a wider set of 
immoral acts from theft to domestic violence included in the definition (Baumeister 7). 
However, similarly to monstrosity and despite the broadness or narrowness of the term, evil is 
primarily seen by scholars of many different theoretical backgrounds as an imperative offence 
against the laws of God, nature and man (Eagleton 2000, 80; 81; 82). According to these 
theories, evil aims to destruct and make void concepts usually held valuable, such as the 
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sanctity of human life. As Baumeister has stated, evil offends people’s most valued beliefs 
(12). This is what makes evil disturbing and fearsome. 
Many researchers believe that the concept of evil can be a very misleading one. 
Eagleton, among others, has claimed that the usual perception of evil includes the idea that if 
cruel actions are explainable, they cannot be evil. If they are evil, there is nothing to add to the 
matter (Eagleton 8; see e.g. Soyka 1992). Eagleton himself does not agree with this contrast. 
On the contrary, he claims that even though evil “transcends everyday social conditioning” 
(16) it is not fundamentally mysterious. The concept of evil thus presents a less mysterious 
approach to heinous acts of crime than monstrosity does. Although evil acts cannot by 
definition be thoroughly justified, there can be attempts of explaining the destructive, “even 
atrocious” forces that work behind evil minds and deeds (Baumeister 8). Baumeister has 
presented an idea that there indeed exists some aspects to analysing evil motives – although 
one could not relate with or justify them because they do not represent rational efforts in 
problem solving or goal pursuing (40). According to Baumeister, evil actions are usually 
massive overreactions to a problem: for example, satisfying sexual desire with rape, domestic 
issues with murder or national conflicts with genocide – or quenching thirst for knowledge with 
dissecting and reanimating corpses, as in the case of Victor Frankenstein. In neuroscience this 
is known as a failure in matching a threat with a response (Taylor 86). 
 Many current scholars tend to avoid the term “evil” altogether because of its 
uncompromising connotations. According to Kathleen Taylor, considering someone as evil 
presents a risk of the essence trap: the belief that a being is controlled by a core essence that is 
difficult or even impossible to change (9). Describing actions as evil, “abominations 
perpetrated by madmen or monsters”, pushes the phenomenon away from ourselves (Taylor 
12). This is why she prefers the terms “cruel” and “cruelty” to “evil”. Instead of seeing someone 
as “irredeemable and impenetrably sadistic” we should study cruel actions as failed threat 
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responses with recognizable motives (57). Perceiving someone as evil may lead to exaggerated 
cruelty towards the feared perpetrator because true evil is commonly regarded to be something 
which can righteously be avenged and annihilated without moral damage to the annihilator 
(Taylor 12–13). This is how Victor Frankenstein sees his creature: as a nonhuman, evil and 
malevolent force that must be either avoided or destroyed. The concept of evil leaves little 
room for debate whereas cruelty is something one can examine and even solve. Simon Baron 
Cohen, the author of The Science of Evil: On Empathy and the Origins of Cruelty prefers the 
term “empathy erosion” to “evil” (Baron Cohen 6). Disorders which can lead to “the empathy 
circuit” being down (Baron Cohen 23, 24, 27–40, 41, 45, 81, 83, 86, 122, 149–150, 153) can 
be examined and sometimes even treated. Trying to explain and understand evil, however, 
poses a moral dilemma. Claiming an offender to be purely evil is an easy explanation for a 
victim’s suffering. Baron Cohen states that the concept of evil is a routine interpretation of 
awful behavior (5). A particular challenge is to explain what makes people capable of causing 
hurt to each other without resorting to a notion of excessive wickedness (Baron Cohen 5).  
Trying to comprehend the perpetrators’ point of view might be considered offensive to 
the victim (Baumeister 8). As Taylor has stated, a mystifying enemy risks no moral burden, 
but an explicable crime might offer the culprit some degree of sympathy (11). Understanding 
the motives for vicious crimes makes evil something it is usually not perceived to be: human. 
Evildoers, as monsters, are easily considered not quite human – free to loathe and excoriate. 
Taylor explains that it is natural to resent and resist attempts to understand evildoers, since 
empathizing with them has the risk of contamination; the listeners might find themselves 
sharing thoughts and feelings with the evildoers (12). Evil is nevertheless a trait one does not 
want to be connected with extrinsically or innately. The term used to disconnect and free 
ourselves from unconceivable crimes and those who commit them. Victor Frankenstein offers 
a fine example of this way of thinking by exclaiming to his creature: “‘Begone! I will not hear 
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you. There can be no community between you and me; we are enemies.’” (F 124) Frankenstein 
thus purges himself of “the contagious evil” of his creature.  
Understanding that human evil and cruelty are not incomprehensible aspects might feel 
alarming because it connects every human being to evil and makes everyone at least 
theoretically able to commit hideous cruelties (Taylor 232). This thought disturbs Victor 
Frankenstein’s young bride, Elizabeth, as she contemplates: “Before, I looked upon the 
accounts of vice and injustice that I read in books or heard from others as tales of ancient days 
or imaginary evils; at least they were remote and more familiar to reason than to the 
imagination; but now misery has come home, and men appear to me as monsters thirsting for 
each other's blood” (F 114). No matter how natural and sometimes psychologically necessary 
this dichotomy between “decent us” end “evil Others” seems, shifting from disconnection to 
communication might not lead to evil taking over but to less cruelty. The depiction of Victor 
Frankenstein and his creature examines this idea. Frankenstein is a fine example of a story in 
which the dichotomy between good and evil does not result into an honourable battle with the 
righteous hero left standing but to death and destruction amongst all. 
 
2.3. The Contribution of This Study 
 
A remarkable number of critical studies discussing evil and monstrosity in Shelley’s 
Frankenstein focus on the creature, his vices and virtues, human language abilities and 
nonhuman appearance. However, as the focus from monstrous appearance has shifted to 
monstrous psychology, I believe that a closer reading of the creator, Victor Frankenstein, is 
needed; not as a parallel character but an individual one. The creature’s monstrous appearance 
can be explained by the failure of the creator and the creature’s crimes can be explained by the 
desperation he feels because of the complete isolation from the human race. Since Victor 
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Frankenstein is the agent of both – the creation and the initial abandonment – it is logical to 
observe this character more closely. I also believe that as the current theory of monstrosity 
relies heavily on the mysteriousness and incomprehensibility of the human mind, theories of 
evil must be utilized more in order to gain a sensible analysis of the character. It would not be 
productive or satisfactory to claim that the monstrous antagonist of Shelley’s novel is Victor 
because one can explain why his creature is not. The aspect of evil provides more material to 
analyzing and understanding the crimes of Frankenstein. Although Victor is commonly 
regarded as a victim of his own actions or by those committed by his creature, Shelley depicts 
the character rather as a vain and arrogant man blind to his own deficiencies than an innocent 
sufferer. Frankenstein’s arrogance makes Shelley’s novel, published in 1818, a very 
contemporary piece of literature worth examining from less utilized perspectives.  
In this analysis of monstrosity and evil in Mary Shelley’s character Victor Frankenstein, 
I rely primarily on three sources: Alexa Wright’s extensive analysis on monsters and 
monstrosity throughout the ages (2013), the theological and philosophical interpretation of evil 
by Terry Eagleton (2000) and the neurological and psychological approach to human evil and 
cruelty by Kathleen Taylor (2009). Two secondary sources are utilized as well: an empathy-
based scientific exploration of evil by Simon Baron Cohen (2011) and a sociological and 
criminological theory by Roy F. Baumeister (1999). As Shelley’s novel utilizes John Milton’s 
Paradise Lost and the concepts of creation, the fallen archangel and the creature as a demon, 
the theological approach is well-founded. A close reading of Frankenstein through the themes 
of Paradise Lost done by Sandra Gilbert and Susan Gubar is utilized in this analysis as well.  
Chapter 3.1. examines the philosophical concepts of monstrosity and theological evil 
in Shelley’s novel. Chapter 3.2. examines the more particular and concrete traits of empathy 
deprivation and cruelty. Outside the philosophical and theological sphere, Taylor’s extensive 
work in understanding human evil through evolution, the synaptic learning paradigm of 
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neuroscience and other well-established theoretical frameworks (233) helps in completing the 
definition and bring it to a contemporary scientific setting. Chapter 3.3. will bring these aspects 
– general and particular, philosophical and concrete, evil and cruelty – together to contemplate 
the consequences of evil.  
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3. Evil and Cruelty in Frankenstein 
3.1. Philosophical and Theological Evil in Shelley’s Frankenstein 
  
This chapter examines the philosophical and theological aspects of evil presented in Mary 
Shelley’s character Victor Frankenstein. The analysis is built on the concept of dualism in evil 
presented by Terry Eagleton (2010) and theories of monstrosity by Alexa Wright (2013), and 
it will also utilize examples of the close reading of Frankenstein by Sandra Gilbert and Susan 
Gubar (2006). The analysis begins with the first aspect of evil: challenging the sacred. It will 
then proceed to another aspect: the removal of the meaningful. Because Frankenstein’s creature 
is commonly (although erroneously) known as the Frankenstein monster, elements of 
monstrosity must be examined as well. 
 
3.1.1. Challenging the Monopoly on the Sacred 
 
The essence of monstrosity lies in challenging established norms. Michel Foucault has stated 
that “...[Monstrosity] is the kind of irregularity that calls the law into question and disables it” 
(qtd. in Wright 101). Besides breaking the norms, as does the monstrous body of Frankenstein’s 
creature, true monstrosity also actively and deliberately threatens the norms, as does Victor 
Frankenstein’s scientific overreaching. Fred Botting has written that “monsters appear in 
literary and political writings to signal both a terrible threat to established orders and a call to 
arms that demands the unification and protection of authorized values” (para. 1). Such values 
include the sanctity of the divine creation and the nurturing of a child: values which Victor 
Frankenstein challenges. Threatening established norms is not only a trait of monstrosity but 
also a key element of the theological definition of evil although the theological perception 
prefers the term “challenging the sacred” to “threatening established norms”.  
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According to Terry Eagleton, challenging the sacred serves two aspects of evil. First, 
evil acts as an counteractive force to everything considered good and righteous. Secondly, evil 
endeavours to make void everything meaningful and form chaos without purpose instead:  
...[E]vil unites these two conditions. One side of it – the angelic ascetic side – 
wants to rise above the degraded sphere of fleshliness in pursuit of the infinite. But this 
withdrawal of the mind from reality has the effect of striking the world empty of value. 
It reduces it to so much meaningless stuff, in which the demonic side of evil can then 
wallow. Evil always posits either too much or too little meaning – or rather it does both 
at the same time. (Eagleton 75) 
Eagleton accentuates two coexisting but simultaneously contradictory aspects of evil: the 
“spiritually elevated” and the “corrosively cynical” (103). Evil thus acts both as the demonic 
counterpart of the sacred (evil striving to liberate itself from limitations) and then again as the 
hollow tainting of meaningful matter (evil wanting to revel in chaos). Monstrous attacks on 
established norms represent the same phenomenon – although from a different scientific 
perspective. 
In the case of Victor Frankenstein it is not the sacred (such as creation) that is attempted 
to be destroyed but the secrecy and unattainability of it. Apparently this craving for knowledge 
and unparalleled success is something instinctive to him. As he describes his scientific passions 
to Captain Walton (the sea captain who rescues him from a shipwreck at the beginning of 
Shelley’s novel), he mentions the delight “in investigating their [the magnificent appearance 
of things] causes” instead of contemplating them with a satisfied spirit. He also describes that 
his “[c]uriosity, earnest research to learn the hidden laws of nature, gladness akin to rapture, as 
they were unfolded to [him]” are amongst the “earliest sensations [he] can remember” (F 42): 
“It was the secrets of heaven and earth that I desired to learn... …still my inquiries were directed 
21 
 
to the metaphysical, or in its highest sense, the physical secrets of the world” (F 44). For 
Frankenstein, the sacred is not something to be marveled at but something to be unraveled. 
Sandra Gilbert and Susan Gubar, who argue that Shelley’s novel is a complex rewriting 
of Milton’s themes of creation and evil, link Frankenstein’s ambition to the diabolical elements 
in Milton’s Paradise Lost. Gilbert and Gubar claim that the proud ventures of both Captain 
Walton and Victor Frankenstein are “satanic” (226). The curiosity towards learning is 
transformed into destructive compulsions as Frankenstein later on describes: “always having 
been imbued with a fervent longing to penetrate the secrets of nature”, “penetrate into the 
recesses of nature” and to reveal “how she works in her hiding-places” (F 57, my italics). 
Frankenstein describes how the “intense labour and wonderful discoveries of modern 
philosophers” leave him “discontented and unsatisfied” (F 46). He feels a fervent need to reach 
further, gazing upon “the fortifications and impediments that seemed to keep human beings 
from entering the citadel of nature (F 47), as he tells Captain Walton in hindsight. The quest 
towards reaching this citadel seems to him a proud and almost noble one: a challenge to the 
limitations of the sacred. Frankenstein dreams of achieving far more and to “pioneer a new 
way, explore unknown powers, and unfold to the world the deepest mysteries of creation” (F 
57). 
Frankenstein’s ambitions of challenging the sacred resemble evil but do not yet render 
chaos or suffering. It is his actions that lead him to chaos. Hence, his contemplation does not 
amount to evil but his determination to act on his impulses does. Gilbert and Gubar claim that 
in his ambitious labor Victor begins to metamorphose from Adam to Satan (231) as he aims to 
ignore God’s monopoly on creation and rise above the restrictions of nature and God. They 
also suggest that Frankenstein’s story of producing “a monster” resembles the stories of fallen 
angels by Milton and Marlowe “in much the same way that Milton’s Satan’s swelled head 
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produced Sin” (231). Whereas Satan challenged the sacred by producing Sin, Victor 
Frankenstein challenges the sacred by producing his creature. 
Victor Frankenstein’s crime is not only that of challenging God’s sacred monopoly on 
creation but also that of disregarding the integrity of the dead. Frankenstein offers limited 
information on the details of grave robbing and corpse dissecting, using euphemisms such as 
“successfully collecting and arranging [his] materials” (F 65), but some passages do offend the 
moral sense, such as the following descriptions: “Who shall conceive the horrors of my secret 
toil as I dabbled among the unhallowed damps of the grave or tortured the living animal to 
animate the lifeless clay?” (F 66): 
I collected bones from charnel-houses and disturbed, with profane fingers, the 
tremendous secrets of the human frame. In a solitary chamber, or rather cell, at the top 
of the house, and separated from all the other apartments by a gallery and staircase, I 
kept my workshop of filthy creation… . The dissecting room and the slaughter-house 
furnished many of my materials... (F 66) 
Besides “torturing living animals”, Frankenstein commits the sin of grave robbing and 
challenges the sanctity connected with the peaceful rest of the dead. Victor explains in his 
narration how his father raised him not to be influenced by “supernatural horrors” or to fear 
“the apparition for a spirit” (F 62). He states that “a churchyard was to me merely the receptacle 
of bodies deprived of life” (F 62). Frankenstein’s upbringing was most probably meant to save 
him from superstitious fears but resulted in him transcending normal behavior and defying 
established norms: one of the indicators of evil or monstrous behavior. Gilbert and Gubar take 
a step further in analysing Frankenstein’s crimes by claiming that the application of “the 
instruments of life” to his creation actually means coupling with the creature. According to 
Gilbert and Gubar, this continues the streak of incestuous relationships depicted in Shelley’s 
novels, similar to the incestuous relationship of Satan and Sin (229). It is a very bold and 
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debatable claim, but should one agree, it would further demonstrate the indifference Victor has 
to the integrity of the dead. Later, while creating a bride for his creature, Victor describes 
finding his labor in constructing another creature “horrible and irksome” and “a filthy process”, 
which he has to enter “in cold blood”, his heart sickening “with obscure forebodings of evil” 
(F 208). However, there is no indication of moral revelations in Victor Frankenstein’s 
narration. It is the labor itself that disgusts him, not the aspect of disrespecting the deceased or 
challenging God. It is possible that the only “horrible and irksome” aspect of his labors is the 
fear of another failure, considering that he managed to surpass similar feelings of disgust while 
constructing the original creature. 
Victor’s crimes against the sanctity of creation manifest themselves in the visible frame 
of his creation. However, the change from appearance to behavior in monster studies helps to 
re-examine the creature’s disfigurement in Frankenstein. The creature’s appalling frame has 
generally been seen as evidence of his innate wickedness. Currently it is seen as evidence of 
the creator’s mischiefs. While creating a new form of life, Victor fantasizes: “A new species 
would bless me as its creator and source; many happy and excellent natures would owe their 
being to me. No father could claim the gratitude of his child so completely as I should deserve 
theirs” (F 65). He succeeds in creating a new lifeform yearning for his acceptance but fails in 
creating a beautiful being. The “monster’s” corpse-like appearance challenges and threatens 
established norms. Besides the disturbing visual link to death, it is the breaking of the 
Aristotelian “Great Chain of Being” or Scala Naturae through scientific efforts that reputedly 
make the creature monstrous. He represents an “unnatural product of philosophical 
overreaching” (Brooks para. 33). “Unnatural births” are also relevant in posthumanist 
bioethics. Nayar states that the question of origins is one of the most argued issues in bioethical 
debate (156). Creatures born in a laboratory, such as the one in Frankenstein, have formerly 
been classified as monstrous due to the unnatural process of their birth (118). As science 
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evolves and procedures such as in vitro fertilization, cloning and gene testing evolve, so do 
perceptions of “unnatural” births. Fictional narratives such as the novel Never Let Me Go 
(2005) by Kazuo Ishiguro and the movie Blade Runner (1982) challenge the monstrosity of 
clones and androids. The discourse also challenges the monstrosity of Frankenstein’s creature 
and questions the moral of the scientist. 
Concerning unnatural origins, Marie-Hélène Huet has studied the Renaissance concept 
of “maternal interference” on a monstrous infant. It was believed that instead of resembling the 
father (which is natural and appropriate), a monstrous child demonstrates the interference of 
“violent female desires” and “female imagination” which have “moved the mother” at the time 
of conception and pregnancy (Huet 2). A somewhat similar interference is described in 
Frankenstein, though not through a conflict of paternal image and maternal interference but in 
the opposites of natural creation and the interference of science. Instead of reproducing a 
normal human image, the appearance of Frankenstein's creature bears witness to the “violent 
desire” that moved the scientist. In a feminist reading of Frankenstein, Sandra Gilbert and 
Susan Gubar have associated this “horror story of maternity” (222) with Frankenstein stating 
that Shelley describes the creation using expressions associated with pain and exhaustion of 
childbirth (232). They also state that Victor’s crimes resembling Satanic pride are not of the 
masculine and Byronic type but those of “the curiously female, outcast Satan who gave birth 
to Sin” (233). Since fictional females have classically been portrayed either as angelic or 
monstrous (Gilbert 240) and the main female characters in Frankenstein represent the virtuous 
type, the monstrous female curiosity is presented in the actions of Victor Frankenstein. The 
production of the monster in Shelley’s novel thus represents a monstrous act of intentional 
defiance to human and natural laws. The violations visible in “the monster’s” body are not, 
however, of his own making but those of his creator, Victor Frankenstein. 
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Besides birth, monstrosity has traditionally been associated with death: in literary 
tradition, evil characters are usually those who seek to challenge the notion of death itself 
(Eagleton 82), either avoiding it or embracing it in a wrong manner (Eagleton 70–71). A prime 
example of this is found in the Harry Potter series in the form of Lord Voldemort’s Horcruxes 
(vessels for his soul which are created to prevent his death). According to Eagleton, the 
unnatural stance towards death is a result of excess pride and unwillingness to “bow the knee 
to the finite, least of all to their own creatureliness” (26). He adds that pride is a characteristic 
Satanic vice making evildoers “so terrified of death, which is the absolute limit of the human” 
(Eagleton 26). Even before robbing graves to collect material for his experiments, Victor 
Frankenstein demonstrates a hostile attitude towards death. While his mother is lying on her 
deathbed and embraces her fate with the words “I will endeavour to resign myself cheerfully 
to death and will indulge a hope of meeting you in another world” (F 51), Frankenstein avoids 
discussing “that most irreparable evil, the void that presents itself to the soul, and the despair 
that is exhibited on the countenance” (F 51). According to Frankenstein, her mother “passed 
away calmly, and her countenance expressed affection even in death” (F 51). Victor himself 
voices an opposite attitude towards death: to him it is an evil opponent. Besides “penetrating 
the mysteries of nature”, Frankenstein ultimately aims at conquering death: “...what glory 
would attend the discovery if I could banish disease from the human frame and render man 
invulnerable to any but a violent death” (F 47); “I might in process of time (although I now 
found it impossible) renew life where death had apparently devoted the body to corruption” (F 
65). His rhetoric is not only sublime and proud but also shows signs of aggression: “Life and 
death appeared to me ideal bounds, which I should first break through, and pour a torrent of 
light into our dark world” (F 65, my italics). In his quest to pour light into a dark world Victor 
might be aiming for good, but in his methods and choice of opponent he represents aspects of 
evil and monstrousness, thus challenging the sacred barrier between life and death.  
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After his creature is set loose and his ambitions have failed him, Frankenstein’s attitude 
towards death changes from hostility to a secret longing. Frankenstein admits to Captain 
Walton that he is “overcome by gloom and misery”, often considering that he “had better seek 
death than desire to remain in a world which to [him] was replete with wretchedness”. 
According to him, only “an unceasing attendance and vigilance” restrains him “from 
committing some dreadful act of violence” (F 226). In refusing to commit suicide (which is a 
mortal sin) Frankenstein might demonstrate some understanding of moral codes. Nevertheless, 
his narration might be a method of gaining sympathy from his listener, Captain Walton. 
 
3.1.2. The Removal of the Meaningful 
 
Evil does not only aim to challenge the sacred. The second aspect of evil presented by Terry 
Eagleton is the complete removal of anything meaningful. Evil has thus been perceived as “a 
purposeless or nonpragmatic wickedness” “not primarily concerned with practical 
consequences” (Eagleton 103), and even “supremely pointless” (Eagleton 84). In other words, 
evil aims to nullify and annihilate all things that are meaningful but does not replace the void 
with new meaning or purpose. Evil merely “reign[s] sovereign in the void left behind” 
(Eagleton 118). Throughout Victor Frankenstein’s narration it is evident that he does not aim 
for a meaningless void but for scientific glory: “...my imagination was too much exalted by my 
first success to permit me to doubt of my ability to give life to an animal as complex and 
wonderful as man” (F 64). In addition to having remarkable objectives, he has remarkable trust 
in his own capabilities. However, as he fails to create a beautiful being he rejects the creature 
altogether and abandons his ambitions. What remains of his scientific discoveries is a hollow 
and painful apathy described in detail in the following chapters. 
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As the concepts of holiness and goodness are associated with meaning and purpose, 
Eagleton associates evil with futility and meaninglessness (13). Good is also associated with 
serenity and contentment as opposed to the restlessness of evil will, eternally “sullen and 
dissatisfied” (Eagleton 65). Chapter 3.3. will further examine Frankenstein’s sufferings 
resulting from the the creation of his “monster”. However, the initial lack of serenity and 
contentment in his character is an important factor in analysing the evil within him. 
Frankenstein describes how his temper as a child was “sometimes violent” and his “passions 
vehement” in addition to not being satisfied with admiring the secret wonders of nature. This 
“temperature”, as he calls it, does not turn to turns to “childish pursuits” but to “an eager desire 
to learn, and not to learn all things indiscriminately” (F 43–44). Afterwards he recognizes the 
corrosive power of his maniacal pursuits and describes how he “sometimes grew alarmed at 
the wreck [he] perceived that [he] had become” while “the energy of [his] purpose alone 
sustained [him]…” (F 68) and how the hard work “lasting nearly two years, for the sole purpose 
of infusing life into an inanimate body” results in him being deprived of rest and health (F 70). 
The manner in which his scientific obsessions become harmful to his own health and well-
being demonstrates the corruptive effects of evil actions. Frankenstein warns his friend, 
Captain Walton (who is eager to discover the mysteries of the North Pole), saying: “If the study 
to which you apply yourself has a tendency to weaken your affections and to destroy your taste 
for those simple pleasures in which no alloy can possibly mix, then that study is certainly 
unlawful, that is to say, not befitting the human mind.” (F 67) For himself, the revelation comes 
too late. 
Shelley offers an interesting contrast to Victor’s unsatisfied mind in the character of the 
unnamed creature. It is evident that he, unlike Victor, aspires to harmonious connections with 
other living beings. He announces to his creator: “If any being felt emotions of benevolence 
towards me, I should return them a hundred and a hundredfold; for that one creature’s sake I 
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would make peace with the whole kind!” (F 184) Despite his seclusion and violent encounters 
with humans, the creature desires companionship (F 183) and shows benevolence even towards 
total strangers: “I rushed from my hiding-place and with extreme labour, from the force of the 
current, saved her and dragged her [a stranger he sees drowning] to shore” (F 177). Thus, the 
creature represents the exact opposite of Victor’s “fall to evil”. Although he has had a 
horrendous life, the creature aims to kindness and diplomacy. Victor, however, turns to crimes 
against creation and the integrity of the dead although he has has a nurtured childhood, 
destroying not only his own life but also those of numerous others. 
Both Taylor and Eagleton have speculated on what makes evil fascinating (Taylor 214–
215, Eagleton 120). Eagleton claims that the puritan propaganda of “prudence, chastity, 
abstinence, sobriety, meekness, frugality, obedience, and self-discipline” understandably 
makes evil a “sexier” option (120). At the same time this dichotomy represents an almost noble 
intention to break free from the restrictions of the sacred, at the same time it demonstrates a 
bored stance on virtuousness. Victor Frankenstein was apparently brought up in a very virtuous 
environment. He was a cherished child of parents who were “closely united in bonds of devoted 
affection”, demonstrating the “sense of justice” in his father’s “upright mind which rendered it 
necessary that he should approve highly to love strongly” (F 37). Victor Frankenstein praises 
his father’s “integrity and indefatigable attention to public business” and his mother’s “greatest 
tenderness” and “mind of uncommon mould” (F 36). Gilbert and Gubar have also described 
Victor’s childhood as “Edenic”, foreshadowing his inevitable Fall, in their comparison between 
Frankenstein and Paradise Lost (230). Victor’s future wife completes the perfect and beautiful 
family accordingly. Frankenstein describes his fiancée as follows: 
[Elizabeth’s] brow was clear and ample, her blue eyes cloudless, and her lips and the 
moulding of her face so expressive of sensibility and sweetness that none could behold 
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her without looking on her as of a distinct species, a being heaven-sent, and bearing a 
celestial stamp in all her features. (F 39) 
Such an amount of virtuous happiness might bore the curious mind of Victor Frankenstein. 
Terry Eagleton states that if someone finds their life growing “stale and insipid”, it might 
inspire them to aspire to the forbidden, extreme and unspeakable in order to “make an effect” 
(69). There are no obvious indications in Victor Frankenstein’s narration that he would 
intentionally defy the virtuous life he led in Geneva. However, he does exhibit an Eagletonian 
type of boredom stating that “[p]artly from curiosity and partly from idleness, I went into the 
lecturing room” in Ingolstadt (F 55). He is thus driven by both urge and boredom. Him defying 
creation and disrespecting the dead might be an attempt to satisfy both of these needs: to satisfy 
the “insurrection and turmoil” in which he has “little power to produce order in” (F 57) and to 
explore worlds beyond the celestial family life. This is the duality presented in evil: claiming 
that inverting conventional moral values is an admirable accomplishment whilst secretly not 
believing in any values (Eagleton 94). This results in destroying social structures in order to 
find peace in emptiness but creating “a monstrous spawning of meaningless matter” (Eagleton 
101) instead. 
While relating his story to Captain Walton, Victor Frankenstein aims to demonstrate 
that he is not a malevolent being. Frankenstein exhibits some happiness in tranquility and 
peacefulness as well as desperation when lacking such emotions. Before relocating to 
Ingolstadt and initiating his gruesome scientific experiments, he remembers being “strangers 
to any species of disunion or dispute” with his fiancée, Elizabeth. He claims that “[h]armony 
was the soul of our companionship, and the diversity and contrast that subsisted in our 
characters drew us nearer together” (F 42). After his experiment of creating a beautiful new 
being fails, he meets the subsequent “void of meaninglessness” with a deep state of 
unhappiness. It is debatable if Frankenstein finds a sort of martyr-like and distorted 
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gratification in this sullenness as he utilizes multiple poetic descriptions to express his 
suffering. Perhaps the evil do not always face a void of meaninglessness with a maniacal laugh 
but with profound self-pity. However, Victor Frankenstein does narrate incidents where a 
temporary easing of discomfort is either aimed at or welcomed. After surviving his first 
encounter with the creature and receiving care and aid from a friend, Frankenstein praises the 
“divine spring” contributing “greatly to [his] convalescence” (F 76). During this time he feels 
“sentiments of joy and affection” reviving and his gloom disappearing (F 76). He continues: 
“...in a short time I became as cheerful as before I was attacked by the fatal passion” (F 76). 
Frankenstein is glad to have regained his spirits. Returning home to his family, Victor narrates 
becoming “the same happy creature who, a few years ago, loved and beloved by all, had no 
sorrow or care” (F 86). After some time he also claims to have been “formed for peaceful 
happiness” and that during his “youthful days discontent never visited [his] mind, and if [he] 
was ever overcome by ennui, the sight of what is beautiful in nature or the study of what is 
excellent and sublime in the productions of man could always interest [his] heart and 
communicate elasticity to [his] spirits” (F 203). He contrasts this to his state of being “a 
miserable spectacle of wrecked humanity, pitiable to others and intolerable to [himself]” (F 
203). Frankenstein’s earlier narration of having an ardent passion to “penetrate the secrets of 
nature” however contradicts the claim of being formed for peaceful happiness. His curiosity 
makes him restless and introverted, not someone “never visited” by discontent, even before 
traveling to Ingolstadt. 
The death of his brother is a vital turning point for Frankenstein. It results in sullenness 
which no consolation can remove. However, there are descriptions of moments when the grief 
lessens. Before encountering his creature for the second time, Victor seeks refuge in the 
mountains and lakes of Switzerland, claiming: “[t]hese sublime and magnificent scenes 
afforded me the greatest consolation that I was capable of receiving. They elevated me from 
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all littleness of feeling, and although they did not remove my grief, they subdued and 
tranquilized it.” (F 119) At this point the natural marvels do not challenge Victor but ease his 
restlessness. As a circle of violence and revenge ensues, Frankenstein finds less and less 
consolation for his grief. However, Frankenstein acknowledges aid when he is offered it. The 
loss of his friend Henry Clerval, killed by Victor’s own monstrous creation, is a severe one. A 
letter he receives from Elizabeth lets “some softened feelings steal into [his] heart”, daring “to 
whisper paradisiacal dreams of love and joy” although “the apple was already eaten, and the 
angel’s arm bared to drive [him] from all hope” (F 239). To help with his turmoil, Frankenstein 
confesses to using small doses of laudanum every night, “for it was by means of this drug only 
that [he is] enabled to gain the rest necessary for the preservation of life” (F 233). It is therefore 
evident that Frankenstein does not revel in the destruction he has created – he suffers because 
of it. This argument is supported by what Victor says to Captain Walton while lying on his 
deathbed: “...my fate is nearly fulfilled. I wait but for one event, and then I shall repose in 
peace” (F 31). Eagleton states that evil beyond the superficial element of the gross is, in fact, 
boring because of its lifelessness that is trapped between life and death (123), “without real 
substance” and “philistine, kitsch-ridden, and banal” (124). Frankenstein feels this lifelessness 
and lack of substance heavily. Evil is bound to result in chaos and suffering, and such is the 
case with Victor Frankenstein as well. Frankenstein describes his own fall from challenging 
the divine to the void of meaninglessness as follows: “I felt the bitterness of disappointment; 
dreams that had been my food and pleasant rest for so long a space were now become a hell to 
me; and the change was so rapid, the overthrow so complete!” (F 71). Frankenstein thus offers 
the reader a prime example of Eagleton’s definition of evil actions and their consequences. 
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3.2. Psychological Evil in Shelley’s Frankenstein 
 3.2.1. Cruelty as Self Protection 
  
Many theoreticians argue that evil actions and cruelty stem from self protection. However, 
instead of protecting one’s physical immunity, people who commit cruel acts often do so while 
protecting their self-images and belief systems from symbolic threats. Kathleen Taylor 
analyzes this type of behavior providing neuroscientific explanations: there exist some 
evolutionary threats (provoking anger, fear or disgust) to which human beings are genetically 
programmed to react either by avoidance or annihilation (71–72). However, as human beings 
have developed sophisticated symbolic thinking, the threat responses that are supposed to 
protect humans from predators or poisoning are now also activated by symbolic threats such as 
humiliation (Taylor 175).   
This shift from tangible to symbolic threats is a strong element in Mary Shelley’s 
Frankenstein. Victor Frankenstein first perceives his creature as an unrestrainable and 
mysterious force of destruction but nevertheless continues to feel anger and disgust towards 
him even after the imminent threat is removed – or at least diminished. The communication 
between him and his creature offers Frankenstein an opportunity to adjust his beliefs about the 
hideous looking but rational and peace-seeking creature. He however fails to do so which leads 
to severe consequences. Taylor states that it is natural to feel anxiety when one’s predictions 
are challenged or proven wrong considering that in the past, the human ability to make 
successful predictions of one’s surroundings helped to prevent being eaten by predators, swept 
away by a flood or poisoned (Taylor 83). Being proven wrong causes neurological stress and 
is attempted to be avoided by most people – even though many current threats posed to human 
beings are symbolic rather than physical and being mistaken in such cases hardly ever exposes 
humans to physical danger (Taylor 84). Victor refusing to adapt a new mindset is hence not 
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extraordinary, especially as the failure of his scientific experimentation causes him symptoms 
such as “breathless horror and disgust” (F 70) as well as a “nervous fever” which confines him 
to bed rest “for several months” (F 75). According to Taylor, the more important a prediction 
or belief is to someone and the more resources are invested in generating such prediction, the 
more stressful it feels to challenge it (84). A person might be considerably reliant on the 
truthfulness of his beliefs and thus even the thought of the emotional and cognitive effort 
required to challenge a prediction might feel excessively painful – even when the individual 
might benefit from the change (Taylor 84). 
Frankenstein’s creature first challenges his creator’s carefully developed self-image as 
a great scientist by not being a successful creation. Subsequently, the creature challenges 
Frankenstein’s stable belief systems of virtuousness by being rational and humane despite his 
supposedly monstrous appearance. According to Roy F. Baumeister, protecting one’s self-
image and belief systems (such as Victor Frankenstein’s belief in his scientific merits and the 
human monopoly on rationality) may lead to cruelty or evil acts (such as Victor Frankenstein 
repeatedly abandoning his creature). Baumeister argues that when people feel that their 
“favorable views of themselves are threatened or disputed by others”, violence ensues (35). 
This argument connects evil with egotism and solipsism. Self-protection from symbolic threats, 
according to Baumeister, might cause evil if people attack those who “insult, criticize or 
humiliate them” (20). This chapter demonstrates the measures which Victor Frankenstein takes 
to defend his solipsistic and erroneous belief systems from symbolic threats.  
Victor Frankenstein’s self-image is strong and secure. Concluding from his narration, 
Frankenstein does not seem to find anyone equal to him in attributes, achievements or even 
woes. Frankenstein’s sense of superiority demonstrates a solipsistic mindset. Simon Baron 
Cohen links solipsistic thinking to empathy by stating that a lack of empathy results from being 
ignorant to the existence of other points of view (43). The ignorance results in believing in a 
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total rightness of one’s beliefs and judging anyone with different views as “wrong” or “stupid” 
(43). Terry Eagleton argues that evil is associated with “a touch of privilege”: “better to fall 
than not be at the top at all” (Eagleton 55). When Victor is lying in his deathbed, his monologue 
demonstrates this touch of privilege:  
“When younger… I believed myself destined for some great enterprise. My feelings are 
profound, but I possessed a coolness of judgment that fitted me for illustrious 
achievements. This sentiment of the worth of my nature supported me when others 
would have been oppressed, for I deemed it criminal to throw away in useless grief 
those talents that might be useful to my fellow creatures. When I reflected on the work 
I had completed, no less a one than the creation of a sensitive and rational animal, I 
could not rank myself with the herd of common projectors… . My imagination was 
vivid, yet my powers of analysis and application were intense; by the union of these 
qualities I conceived the idea and executed the creation of a man. Even now I cannot 
recollect without passion my reveries while the work was incomplete. I trod heaven in 
my thoughts, now exulting in my powers, now burning with the idea of their effects. 
From my infancy I was imbued with high hopes and a lofty ambition; but how am I 
sunk!” (F 267)  
Victor Frankenstein is clearly not a humble man – which also means that has a lot to defend 
from challenging views.  
Victor Frankenstein offers plenty of examples of his superiority. He describes his 
favourite books as “treasures known to few besides myself” (F 46) and academic success by 
stating: “My ardour was indeed the astonishment of the students, and my proficiency that of 
the masters” (F 60–61). As he ventures deeper into the mysteries of creation he exclaims: “...I 
was surprised that among so many men of genius who had directed their inquiries towards the 
same science, that I alone should be reserved to discover so astonishing a secret” (F 63). Along 
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with his intelligence, Frankenstein takes pride in his remarkable resilience: “‘I have one secret, 
Elizabeth, a dreadful one; when revealed to you, it will chill your frame with horror, and then, 
far from being surprised at my misery, you will only wonder that I survive what I have 
endured’” (F 240). Equal admiration for his endurance is also present as he describes to Walton 
his determination to find “the monster”: “My courage and perseverance were invigorated by 
these scoffing words [those of the town magistrate]; I resolved not to fail in my purpose, and 
calling on heaven to support me, I continued with unabated fervour to traverse immense deserts, 
until the ocean appeared at a distance and formed the utmost boundary of the horizon” (F 260). 
There is also a hint of privilege in the depictions of Victor’s wretchedness: “...no creature had 
ever been so miserable as I was; so frightful an event is single in the history of man” (F 250); 
“I trembled with excess of agitation as I said this; there was a frenzy in my manner, and 
something, I doubt not, of that haughty fierceness which the martyrs of old are said to have 
possessed” (F 254). Victor does not only live an abnormally intense life having (according to 
himself) “a heart overflowed with kindness and the love of virtue” (F 111), he also suffers 
intensely.  
Victor Frankenstein’s high self-image is not limited to his attributes and emotions but 
extends to his observations and conclusions. Even when Victor has little tangible evidence to 
support his theories, they represent the absolute truth to him. For example, after the first 
sighting of his creature since leaving Ingolstadt, he concludes that the creature must be guilty 
of his brother’s murder saying that the “mere presence of the idea was an irresistible proof of 
the fact” (F 93). Frankenstein is in fact correct on this occasion, but the unwavering trust in his 
own intuitions also contributes to a tragedy: on his wedding night, Victor fails to consider the 
possibility that his creature could prey on anyone else but him. He assumes that the creature is 
fixated on him alone and thus leaves his newlywed bride unprotected and unaware of the 
assailant: “I passed an hour in this state of mind, when suddenly I reflected how fearful the 
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combat which I momentarily expected would be to my wife, and I earnestly entreated her to 
retire, resolving not to join her until I had obtained some knowledge as to the situation of my 
enemy” (F 247). Although Victor’s prideful solipsism might not amount to evil actions in this 
incident, it leads to violence and grief.  
As previously stated, Victor Frankenstein’s solipsistic thinking reaches dangerous 
heights when he fails to consider the safety of others. Besides leaving his newlywed bride 
vulnerable to assault, he initially fails to warn anyone of his creature who he believes to be 
malevolent. When his close friend Henry Clerval meets him after his failed experiment, Victor 
declares: “‘I have lately been so deeply engaged in one occupation that I have not allowed 
myself sufficient rest, as you see; but I hope, I sincerely hope, that all these employments are 
now at an end and that I am at length free’” (F 73). Victor fears the creature immensely and 
calls him a monster but does not take sufficient procedures to protect others from him. When 
Victor loses sight of the creature he considers himself free. When departing for Scotland he is 
certain that the monster will only pursue him: “During my absence I should leave my friends 
unconscious of the existence of their enemy and unprotected from his attacks, exasperated as 
he might be by my departure. But he had promised to follow me wherever I might go, and 
would he not accompany me to England? This imagination was dreadful in itself, but soothing 
inasmuch as it supposed the safety of my friends.” (F 194)  Frankenstein decides to leave his 
friends unarmed and unaware of the existence of a possible threat. After observing his creature 
for the first time since leaving Ingolstadt, Victor fears being perceived as a madman if he tells 
people about the “monster”, claiming that the story and “its astounding horror would be looked 
upon as madness by the vulgar” (F 98). Even after the creature has murdered his brother as 
well as his best friend and threatened to attack again on his wedding night, Frankenstein persists 
in keeping his secret and and maintains “a continual silence concerning the wretch” because 
he has a “persuasion that [he] should be supposed mad” which “itself would forever have 
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chained [his] tongue” (F 235). He claims to control his “impatient thirst for sympathy” and 
remain silent instead of confiding to the world his “fatal secret” (F 235) because of his 
reputation and ego. It would seem that a symbolic threat to his self-image weighs more to him 
than the physical threat to his loved ones.  
Victor Frankenstein’s high self-image is demonstrated not only in how it raises him 
above other people but also in how it secludes him from others. Despite his rhetorical and social 
abilities he is in fact remarkably introverted, making his self-image and belief systems even 
less susceptible to challenging views. Frankenstein’s solitude is the result of pride, not shyness, 
and might be interpreted as a threat response to being proved wrong. Eagleton claims that 
dependency on others is human and that “pure autonomy is a dream of evil” (12). As evil is 
associated with an inability to be influenced or changed, Victor making himself unreachable 
makes him more fearsome and uncontrollable. His tendency to prefer solitude is evident in 
many passages of his narration: “It was my temper to avoid a crowd and to attach myself 
fervently to a few. I was indifferent, therefore, to my school-fellows in general...” (F 43). 
Although he claims to be attached to a few people, Victor repeatedly secludes himself from 
these closest friends as well: “I shunned the face of man; all sound of joy or complacency was 
torture to me; solitude was my only consolation – deep, dark, deathlike solitude” (F 111–112); 
“I took refuge in the most perfect solitude. I passed whole days on the lake alone in a little 
boat...” (F 189–190). Besides seeking solitude, he refuses to share his inner turmoil with his 
loved ones when they try to approach him: “My father’s care and attentions were indefatigable, 
but he did not know the origin of my sufferings and sought erroneous methods to remedy the 
incurable ill” (F 234). His misfortunes are beyond even his closest relatives and friends. 
Events which could potentially draw Victor closer to his peers in mourning further 
seclude him. An example of this emerges after a close family friend is convicted of William 
Frankenstein’s murder: “I saw an insurmountable barrier placed between me and my fellow 
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men; this barrier was sealed with the blood of William and Justine, and to reflect on the events 
connected with those names filled my soul with anguish” (F 200). The consolation offered to 
Frankenstein’s grief (which is also shared by his loved ones) has little or no effect on him. He 
claims: “[his father’s] advice [of socializing more], although good, was totally inapplicable to 
my case” (F 112); “Thus not the tenderness of friendship, nor the beauty of earth, nor of heaven, 
could redeem my soul from woe; the very accents of love were ineffectual. I was encompassed 
by a cloud which no beneficial influence could penetrate” (F 116). Frankenstein continues, 
however: “He [his father] wished me to seek amusement in society. I abhorred the face of man. 
Oh, not abhorred! They were my brethren, my fellow beings, and I felt attracted even to the 
most repulsive among them, as to creatures of an angelic nature and celestial mechanism. But 
I felt that I had no right to share their intercourse.” (F 234) These conflicting narratives of 
Frankenstein leave the reader confused whether he truly appreciates his closest friends as he 
claims to (“dear not only through habit and association, but from their own merits” {F 268}), 
or does he only argue so in order to impress Captain Walton and construct an image of a loving 
and caring person.  
While he prepares himself for the creation of a new being, he rationalizes his seclusion 
suggesting it is for the benefit of his loved ones: “I was aware also that I should often lose all 
self-command, all capacity of hiding the harrowing sensations that would possess me during 
the progress of my unearthly occupation. I must absent myself from all I loved while thus 
employed” (F 192). Nevertheless, while Victor refuses to share his ordeals and resists 
consolation from his closest friends, he also suffers from the self-inflicted loneliness: “...no one 
was near me who soothed me with the gentle voice of love; no dear hand supported me” (F 
226). Such prideful seclusion is something Victor has criticized when demonstrated by another 
being. When Victor is telling Captain Walton the story of his parents, he describes his father’s 
destitute friend who has taken refuge far away from his companions: “He [Victor’s father] 
39 
 
bitterly deplored the false pride which led his friend to a conduct so little worthy of the affection 
that united them” (F 36). The lesson is one he has not learnt himself – perhaps because he feels 
to be above it. If the seclusion from his family and friends is indeed a threat response to being 
proven erroneous, he might fear that admitting his scientific overreaching would not result in 
compassion and consolation but in blaming. His loved ones might not see him as a victim but 
as someone who must make amends. This would challenge his self-image as the guiltless 
sufferer – a role he emphasizes to Captain Walton in his narration.  
A substantial part of Victor Frankenstein’s self-image is indeed the idea of himself as 
a victim. Roy F. Baumeister has stated that as a part of self-defence from symbolic threats, 
perpetrators of cruel or evil acts usually do not consider their own actions evil (11). Kathleen 
Taylor points out that, much like victims, perpetrators may present themselves as reasonable 
and likeable people in order to gain empathy – not only by facts but also by lying, blurring 
memories and convincing even themselves of their own innocence (47). Taylor adds that for 
perpetrators (who usually are highly egocentric characters), one favourite strategy in seeking 
justification is to focus on themselves rather than their victims (48). Such is the case of Victor 
Frankenstein who aims to protect his self-image from blame and guilt emphasizing his part as 
a victim: “I felt as if I had committed some great crime, the consciousness of which haunted 
me. I was guiltless, but I had indeed drawn down a horrible curse upon my head, as mortal as 
that of crime” (F 205, my italics). On his deathbed he relates his life story to his new friend, 
Walton, claiming: “During these last days I have been occupied in examining my past conduct; 
nor do I find it blamable. In a fit of enthusiastic madness I created a rational creature and was 
bound towards him to assure, as far as was in my power, his happiness and well-being” (F 274, 
my italics). Victor Frankenstein’s claims of being concerned for his creature’s happiness are 
evidently untrue. Nevertheless, they are crucial in supporting his self-image as a benevolent 
person.  
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Considering how Captain Walton is smitten with his new friend, Victor Frankenstein 
can clearly act in a very alluring way. The amount Walton’s praises is almost comical. Victor 
receives descriptions such as: “[w]hat a glorious creature must he have been in the days of his 
prosperity, when he is thus noble and godlike in ruin!” (F 267, my italics). There is an 
abundance of complimentary remarks on Frankenstein and “the extraordinary merits of this 
wonderful man” (F 31) who is not only celestial in countenance but also “although unhappy... 
...not so utterly occupied by his own misery but [interested] deeply in the projects of others” 
(F 29). Walton finds himself endeavouring to “discover what quality it is which he possesses 
that elevates him so immeasurably above any other person” he has ever known (F 31). He 
deduces it to be “an intuitive discernment, a quick but never-failing power of judgment, a 
penetration into the causes of things, unequalled for clearness and precision; add to this a 
facility of expression and a voice whose varied intonations are soul-subduing music” (F 31, my 
italics). Walton’s love for his new friend seems somewhat overstated, but numerous examples 
of such charisma exist in the history of mankind. The “saint-like” Frankenstein does admit to 
some degree of guilt at times but only when associated with, for example, his “prophetic soul” 
being “torn by remorse, horror, and despair” (F 110), or the “never-dying worm alive in [his] 
bosom, which allowed of no hope or consolation” (F 109). Many researchers, such as Baron 
Cohen, offer ample information on convincing but misleading amiability linking it to 
narcissistic personality disorder. However, diagnosing Victor Frankenstein would be 
problematic to say the least. It is true that people with, for example, antisocial personality 
disorder or narcissism are easily described as evil (Baron Cohen 67), and many famous 
criminals have been diagnosed with psychopathy or narcissism, but here a line must be drawn 
between psychology and literature. Although some attributes of mental disorders might help 
understand such characters better, making definitive diagnoses of fictional characters who the 
authors themselves have not diagnosed is hardly conductive.  
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Victor Frankenstein justifies his self-image as a victim by downplaying his own agency 
and focusing on hard determinism – issues Kathleen Taylor has examined when studying 
cruelty (48). To protect his guiltless self-image, Victor blames his dramatic ruin on destiny 
rather than his own actions. For example, as Victor is telling his story to the sea captain, he 
describes “those events which led, by insensible steps, to [his] tale of misery” (F 45). His 
passion “which afterwards ruled [his] destiny” arose, “like a mountain river” becoming “the 
torrent which, in its course, has swept away all [his] hopes and joys” (F 45). Victor finds his 
“soul constructed” “thus strangely”, that by “such slight ligaments” he is “bound to prosperity 
or ruin” and depicts how “destiny was too potent, and her immutable laws had decreed [his] 
utter and terrible destruction” (F 49). Victor also claims to see wicked omens in nature, as the 
darkness of the night and the dark mountains compose “a vast and dim scene of evil”, which 
makes him foresee that he is “destined to become the most wretched of human beings” (F 91). 
Although he narrates having “prophesied truly”, he could not have conceived “the hundredth 
part of anguish” he was “destined to endure” (F 91).                               Frankenstein also sees 
his mother’s death as “an omen” (F 50) of his future miseries thus taking over a family tragedy 
to explain his own downfall. His miseries are not the only events explained by divine 
interference. Mundane events such as meeting his natural philosophy professor represent 
“chance – or rather the evil influence, the Angel of Destruction, which asserted omnipotent 
sway over me from the moment I turned my reluctant steps from my father’s door” (F 54), and 
his first discussion with the professor represents “... the words of the fate – enounced to destroy 
me” (F 57). It is significant how the word “destiny” is a repeating element in his narration. It 
is this omnipotent force that causes his miseries, not his own decisions and actions.   
However, it is not only maniacal enthusiasm and divine intervention that guide Victor’s 
unwilling character. Some blame, according to Frankenstein, can be found in the beings 
surrounding him. When communicating with his creature for the first time Victor exclaims: 
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“You have left me no power to consider whether I am just to you or not” (F 125) and later 
describes his own error of judgement that led to the death of his bride as follows: “But, as if 
possessed of magic powers, the monster had blinded me to his real intentions; and when I 
thought that I had prepared only my own death, I hastened that of a far dearer victim” (F 242). 
Frankenstein does not only blame his creature for his troubles but also his father. As he narrates 
his scientific ambitions to Walton, Frankenstein remarks that as a child he was “left to struggle 
with a child’s blindness, added to a student’s thirst for knowledge” (F 47), his father not being 
a scientific man. He goes further by saying: “If... my father had taken the pains to explain to 
me... I should certainly have thrown Agrippa aside [a pseudo scientific book Frankenstein was 
infatuated with] and have contented my imagination... It is even possible that the train of my 
ideas would never have received the fatal impulse that led to my ruin” (F 45–46). At times 
when Victor claims to feel remorse, it is strongly connected to the sense of inevitable destiny. 
For example, when Frankenstein describes his wretchedness (though not the reasons for it) to 
his father, he says: “‘Alas! My father,’ said I, ‘how little do you know me. Human beings, their 
feelings and passions, would indeed be degraded if such a wretch as I felt pride. Justine, poor 
unhappy Justine, was as innocent as I, and she suffered the same charge; she died for it; and I 
am the cause of this—I murdered her. William, Justine, and Henry—they all died by my 
hands.’” (F 234–235) Considering the effort Victor makes to suppress his own agency, one 
cannot be sure if this “testimony” is a true indicator of guilt or if it falls into the category of 
martyr-like sympathy evoking that Frankenstein is no stranger to.  
Victor Frankenstein’s solipsistic pride and overreaching threat responses are not, as 
stated, clear illustrations of evil. Terry Eagleton, quoting the philosopher John Rawls, points 
out: “What moves the evil man is the love of injustice: he delights in the impotence and 
humiliation of those subject to him and relishes being recognized by them as the author of their 
degradation” (qtd. in Eagleton 94). Kathleen Taylor also draws a line between callous cruelty 
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(which inflicts suffering on a victim while in pursuit of other goals such as self-preservation) 
and sadistic cruelty (which aims at inflicting suffering because of the pleasure it causes the 
inflictor) (203). Taylor states that the delight of hurting is the defining characteristic of human 
evil (204). Eagleton takes this a step further by claiming that evil “is an example of pure 
disinterestedness” (93). There is no evidence in either of their narratives supporting a claim 
that Frankenstein or his creature would be sadistic. Their actions are motivated by threat 
response and revenge, and neither relish their actions. There exist theories which attempt to 
rank perpetrators of evil actions such as the Scale of Evil by Michael Stone (Presented in the 
TV-series Most Evil {2006}). It is also believed that there exists an intrinsic moral code within 
human beings specifying that sadistic cruelty is “worse” than callous cruelty (Taylor 172). 
However, cruelty based on threat responses and the inability to perceive the world from any 
other point of view than one’s own has had detrimental consequences throughout human 
history – genocides and ethnic purges being clear examples. As demonstrated in the next 
chapter, Victor’s egotistical tendencies and lack of empathy do not only result in his own 
demise but several others’ as well.  
 
3.2.2. Lack of Empathy and Otherization 
  
Many scholars argue that the essence of human evil lies in a lack of empathy for other living 
beings (e.g. Baron Cohen, Baumeister, Taylor). In her analysis of human monsters, such as the 
serial killer Ted Bundy, Alexa Wright claims that it is the lack of empathy for his victims that 
makes a monster fearsome (Wright 156). Ted Bundy, for example, showed no emotion whilst 
confessing and describing his brutal murders (Wright 153). Baron Cohen defines empathy as 
follows: “Empathy is our ability to identify what someone else is thinking or feeling and to 
respond to their thoughts and feelings with and appropriate emotion” (16, original italics). 
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Sometimes empathy includes adapting the same mindset. A clear example of this is found in 
Shelley’s Frankenstein when Frankenstein’s creature describes watching and observing the 
DeLancey family from his hiding place: “...when they were unhappy, I felt depressed; when 
they rejoiced, I sympathized in their joys...” (F 140). Baron Cohen has demonstrated how early 
childhood traumas and neglect have a connection with empathy disorders and, further, how a 
caregiver can supply an infant with an “internal pot of gold”, as he calls it (70–72). This means 
that an affectionate parent can raise a child to have good emotional stamina and the ability to 
form functional and meaningful relationships. In the first chapter of Shelley’s novel, Victor 
Frankenstein describes how his “mother's tender caresses” and his “father's smile of benevolent 
pleasure while regarding [him]” were his “first recollections” (F 38). He continues:   
I was their plaything and their idol, and something better—their child, the innocent and 
helpless creature bestowed on them by heaven, whom to bring up to good, and whose 
future lot it was in their hands to direct to happiness or misery, according as they 
fulfilled their duties towards me. With this deep consciousness of what they owed 
towards the being to which they had given life, added to the active spirit of tenderness 
that animated both, it may be imagined that while during every hour of my infant life I 
received a lesson of patience, of charity, and of self-control, I was so guided by a silken 
cord that all seemed but one train of enjoyment to me. (F 38)  
It would thus seem that Victor Frankenstein should have received a substantial “internal pot of 
gold” from his loving parents, as “no human being could have passed a happier childhood” 
than Victor: his parents “were possessed by the very spirit of kindness and indulgence” (F 43). 
Frankenstein observes his parents’ pattern of empathy not only for family members but also 
for the less fortunate, describing their philanthropy as “their benevolent disposition [which] 
often made them enter the cottages of the poor” (F 39). He continues: “This, to my mother, 
was more than a duty; it was a necessity, a passion… for her to act in her turn the guardian 
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angel to the afflicted” (F 39). The kind of abandonment and violent rejection Frankenstein’s 
creature suffers could easily lead to developing a severe empathy disorder. The nurtured 
childhood Victor experiences could easily lead to a healthy interaction between living beings. 
This, however, is not the case in Frankenstein.  
Although it can be argued that Victor Frankenstein rather demonstrates the need to 
showcase benevolence than actually acts benevolently, there are some indicators of his ability 
to empathize with others. One example can be found in chapter nine where he mourns the 
deaths of his little brother William and family friend Justine:   
I was tempted to plunge into the silent lake, that the waters might close over me and 
my calamities forever. But I was restrained, when I thought of the heroic and suffering 
Elizabeth, whom I tenderly loved, and whose existence was bound up in mine. I thought 
also of my father and surviving brother... .(F 113)  
Instead of adapting a “single-minded” approach by thinking only from his own point of view 
(Baron Cohen 16), he reflects on the well-being of his family. Another example of Victor’s 
capacity to empathize can be found when he listens to his creature’s tragic tale. While telling 
his story to his creator, the creature states: “Pitiless as you have been towards me, I now see 
compassion in your eyes...” (F 184). Most likely, the creature does not merely imagine this 
compassion because Frankenstein himself states: “I was moved…  I felt that there was some 
justice in his argument. His tale and the feelings he now expressed proved him to be a creature 
of fine sensations, and did I not as his maker owe him all the portion of happiness that it was 
in my power to bestow?” (F 184). Even before hearing the story of his creature, Frankenstein 
ponders whether or not to follow the creature into his hut:   
... I weighed the various arguments that he had used and determined at least to listen to 
his tale. I was partly urged by curiosity, and compassion confirmed my resolution. I had 
hitherto supposed him to be the murderer of my brother, and I eagerly sought a 
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confirmation or denial of this opinion. For the first time, also, I felt what the duties of 
a creator towards his creature were, and that I ought to render him happy before I 
complained of his wickedness. These motives urged me to comply with his demand. (F 
126, my italics)   
These excerpts suggest that Victor Frankenstein is not innately incapable of empathy (although 
there is a possibility that he is manipulating his listener, Captain Walton, in order to gain 
sympathy). It is however evident that empathy is not among the strongest personal traits of 
Frankenstein. As discussed before, Victor is not a very sociable human being. Besides seeking 
solitude, he sometimes judges his fellow human beings very strictly on little information. For 
example, when Frankenstein begins his studies in Ingolstadt, he describes his professor Mr. 
Kempe as “a little squat man with a gruff voice and a repulsive countenance” (F 55) and as “a 
little conceited fellow” (F 56). As his studies progress, his opinion on the professor improves 
a little but the impolite tone does not soften: “... I found even in M. Krempe a great deal of 
sound sense and real information, combined, it is true, with a repulsive physiognomy and 
manners” (F 60). When Victor is convalescing in Ireland, he evaluates his caregiver as follows:  
She was a hired nurse, the wife of one of the turnkeys, and her countenance expressed 
all those bad qualities which often characterize that class. The lines of her face were 
hard and rude, like that of persons accustomed to see without sympathizing in sights of 
misery. Her tone expressed her entire indifference; she addressed me in English, and 
the voice struck me as one that I had heard during my sufferings. “Are you better now, 
sir?” said she. (F 225)  
Yet another example of Victor’s sense of superiority can be found after the creature has 
attacked Frankenstein’s newlywed bride. Victor tries to persuade a Genevan magistrate “whose 
mind was occupied by far other ideas than those of devotion and heroism” (F 254) to hunt and 
kill the creature. It is important to note that Victor is in a state of emotional turmoil but 
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nevertheless the projection of his own indiscretions on the magistrate is an interesting one: 
“‘Man,’ I cried, ‘how ignorant art thou in thy pride of wisdom!’” (F 254). It is evident that the 
creature is not the only living being who does not meet Victor Frankenstein’s high standards 
of beauty, elegance and intelligence.  
Nonetheless, even kinship is not a sufficient factor for Victor Frankenstein to recognize 
agency outside his own solipsistic self-image. Baron Cohen defines reduced empathy as 
ceasing to “treat another person as a person, with their own feelings, and start to treat them as 
an object” (182). This does not always result in callous cruelty or violence. Frankenstein 
depicts objectification also amongst family and friends. Victor Frankenstein repeatedly 
discusses his loved ones but at times it can be questioned how much reciprocity actually exists 
in these relationships. For example, when Victor indulges himself in his studies, the one-sided 
correspondence from Geneva to Ingolstadt is mentioned several times. A sole focus on the 
pursuit of one’s own interests is what gives every human being the potential to be unempathetic 
(Cohen 8). Victor explains how his father “made no reproach in his letters and only took notice 
of [his] silence by inquiring into [his] occupations more particularly than before” (F 68). Henry 
Clerval mentions to Victor that  “...‘[his] father and cousin would be very happy if they received 
a letter from [him] in [his] own handwriting. They hardly know how ill [he has] been and are 
uneasy at [his] long silence.’” (F 76) While conducting his experiments, it is emphasized that 
Victor is engaged with is “heart and soul, in the pursuit of some discoveries which [he] hoped 
to make” while paying “no visit to Geneva” for two years (F 61).  
The neglect Victor displays to his childhood home while being immersed in his studies 
does not concern only his immediate family but also his future wife. Besides not 
communicating to her over the course of several years, Victor later assumes without a doubt 
that Elizabeth is obedient to his wishes, communicating to her that “‘I will confide this tale of 
misery and terror [the existence of his creature] to you the day after our marriage shall take 
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place… but until then, I conjure you, do not mention or allude to it. This I most earnestly 
entreat, and I know you will comply.’” (F 240). While Elizabeth suffers alongside Victor 
without knowing the real reason for her fiancé’s emotional turmoils, Victor describes her as 
follows: “She was thinner and had lost much of that heavenly vivacity that had before charmed 
me; but her gentleness and soft looks of compassion made her a more fit companion for one 
blasted and miserable as I was” (F 240). Yet again, Victor sees her as someone whose loss of 
“heavenly vivacity” is a suitable match to his own miseries, not an alarming signal of distress 
or a request for compassion. Gilbert and Gubar claim that Elizabeth is an Eve-like character to 
be possessed to Victor (230–231). Elizabeth would thus be, in the eyes of Victor Frankenstein, 
an object to be obtained instead of an individual being. The solipsism in Frankenstein, 
according to Gilbert and Gubar, is also hinted on in the “barely disguised incest” occurring in 
the marriage (228) as Elizabeth was raised with Victor as his sister – or even for Victor as Eve 
was created for Adam. 
The discussed failings of empathy are notable but do not as such amount to evil. What 
truly interests researchers of evil are reasons why people actively decide not to empathize with 
others. Refusing to feel empathy is not always evil, monstrous or cruel. At times it can be an 
essential coping mechanism for example when protecting kin from an assaulter (Taylor 173). 
If a loved one is being attacked, the brain usually cannot process both protecting the loved one 
and trying to understand what motivates the assaulter. What however can amount to evil is 
refusing to see “double-mindedly” instead of “single-mindedly” (Baron Cohen 15–16) even 
when it would be beneficial or even necessary. Eagleton’s discussion supports this, although 
he does not refer to empathy erosion but to “a lack of sympathetic imagination” which means 
the inability to conceive what others are feeling (52). For example, responding to his creature’s 
loneliness with compassion could be beneficial to Victor Frankenstein’s well-being but he 
decides to continue seeing him as a malevolent monster. The conscious “single-minded” 
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approach leads to one of the main concepts of evil: “otherization”, also known as 
“demonization”, “social death”, “dehumanization”, “objectification” (Taylor 7) and 
“Othering” (Nayar 147). Otherization occurs when threat responses are used against an 
undeserving party. Nayar states that “Others” are cultural representations of “the repulsive” 
opposites to humans, such as “monsters, beggars, madmen, freaks, mutants, animals and the 
differently abled” (138). However, otherization also occurs with human beings of different 
races, religions and even political opinions.  Interpreting the creature’s appearance as a sign of 
malevolence rather than Frankenstein’s incompetence as a scientist is an example of 
otherization. Another example is Victor blaming his failure to protect his bride on the creature’s 
“blinding magic powers” rather than his own solipsistic thinking. The concept of “the Other” 
is not only psychological but also philosophical. Emmanuel Levinas, for example, has 
famously argued that ethical behavior is founded on the respect towards “the otherness of the 
Other” (Phelan 2013; Levinas 1969). This respect is an attribute that Victor Frankenstein 
evidently lacks. 
Otherization relates to the concept of the essence trap: our own misdemeanours are 
explained as errors or misjudgements but similar actions by people we dislike happen because 
of their malevolent character – less changeable, less morally redeemable and more responsible 
(Taylor 9). Baumeister’s theories support this, describing evil as a force universally thought to 
rise outside one’s own sphere and belong to foreigners or people otherwise different (27). Since 
Frankenstein’s creature resembles a human being only vaguely, he is an easy target for 
otherization. In addition, many perpetrators of cruel acts feel it necessary to disregard the 
victim’s suffering in order to continue their course of action (Baumeister 9). This can be 
achieved by, for example, generating beliefs or emotions which prevent feeling empathy 
towards the victim (Taylor 188). Disregarding the victim results in callousness: deliberately 
using otherization to ignore the victim’s suffering or to downplay their capacity to feel (Taylor 
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57). Victor Frankenstein, for example, is given a thorough testimonial of his creature’s 
emotional capacity but nevertheless continues to perceive the creature merely as a malevolent 
fiend. 
As stated, Frankenstein does feel some compassion towards his creature but eventually 
suppresses it. The creature exclaims: “‘How inconstant are your feelings! But a moment ago 
you were moved by my representations, and why do you again harden yourself to my 
complaints?’” (F 185). Although it is quite difficult to conclude from Victor’s narration why 
he behaves as he does, a callous and deliberate single-mindedness is clearly evident in his 
attitude towards the creature. Is it the creature’s abhorrent appearance that prevents 
Frankenstein from sympathizing with him? A passage in which he listens to his creature’s story 
would suggest so:  
I compassionated him and sometimes felt a wish to console him, but when I looked 
upon him, when I saw the filthy mass that moved and talked, my heart sickened and my 
feelings were altered to those of horror and hatred. I tried to stifle these sensations; I 
thought that as I could not sympathize with him, I had no right to withhold from him 
the small portion of happiness which was yet in my power to bestow. (F 185)  
A theory by Kathleen Taylor explains Victor’s prejudices concerning his creature’s monstrous 
appearance: “...people labelled as weak, treacherous, selfish, or disgusting ‘Others’ are most 
threatening when they challenge those stereotypes – by displaying strength, being trustworthy, 
showing kindness, or evoking the instinctive warmth and concern required in order to 
overcome disgust” (165). This is why the ability of a “monster” to feel human emotions is 
usually perceived as “a redeeming feature” (Nayar 119; see also Feder 2010). Disability studies 
claim that an objectified impaired body “is reduced to its impairment” making impairment the 
“the individual's primary identity” (Nayar 143).  Perhaps Victor has learned to associate 
psychological virtues with exterior beauty while living with his parents and fiancée. Perhaps 
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the thought of an appallingly ugly but spiritually elevated being threatens his belief systems 
and hence is easier to disregard as “an Other” than to accept as an equal. The creature thus 
taunts Victor’s pride twice: first by failing to be the perfectly beautiful creature he was intended 
to be (a member of his beautiful and virtuous class), then by not being the vicious monster he 
was thought to be (a member of a lower, ignorant class).   
Sometimes otherization serves to fill a void between the supply of truth and the demand 
for security (Taylor 188). Before he and his creature first communicate, Frankenstein’s 
descriptions of the creature offer a fine example of otherization based on ignorance and fear. 
Even when Frankenstein feels compassion and curiosity towards his creature, he describes him 
as “the fiend” when they enter his hut (F 126). A lack of better knowledge can explain why 
Frankenstein, obsessed with beauty and traumatized by the grief from his brother’s death, 
portrays his creature as a “depraved wretch, whose delight was in carnage and misery” and 
“[his] own vampire… …forced to destroy all that was dear to [him]” (F 94). Before he is 
reunited with his creature, Frankenstein feels he must live in “daily fear lest the monster… 
...should perpetrate some new wickedness” (F 113). The mere thought of this “monster” causes 
Victor to experience violent fantasies of “extinguish[ing] that life which [he] had so 
thoughtlessly bestowed” (F 113). He feels “hatred and revenge” bursting “all bounds of 
moderation” (F 113). Breaking moderation and wishing to “wreak the utmost extent of 
abhorrence on his head and avenge” (F 113) falls into the category of an exaggerated threat 
response but is still somewhat understandable – especially considering that this mysterious and 
fearsome creature has apparently strangled his younger brother and caused the death of a family 
friend. The strong emotion and rush of adrenaline is evident also when the creator and creature 
are reunited in chapter nine:  
I trembled with rage and horror, resolving to wait his approach and then close with him 
in mortal combat. He approached; his countenance bespoke bitter anguish, combined 
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with disdain and malignity, while its unearthly ugliness rendered it almost too horrible 
for human eyes. But I scarcely observed this; rage and hatred had at first deprived me 
of utterance, and I recovered only to overwhelm him with words expressive of furious 
detestation and contempt. (F 122–123)  
The first ever words from the creator to his creature are as follows:   
‘Devil,’ I exclaimed, ‘do you dare approach me? And do not you fear the fierce 
vengeance of my arm wreaked on your miserable head? Begone, vile insect! Or rather, 
stay, that I may trample you to dust! And, oh! That I could, with the extinction of your 
miserable existence, restore those victims whom you have so diabolically murdered!’ 
(F 123)  
It is unquestionably an extreme otherization to call someone a “devil” and a “vile insect” but 
in this context it can be categorized as a coping mechanism based on ignorance and fear.   
What does not fall into the category of an understandable threat response is Victor’s 
callousness towards the creature’s motives and life story. Although in social psychology and 
criminology there exists ample evidence of “mutual, escalating provocations” (Baumeister 65) 
that result in crimes commonly perceived evil, for the truly evil the sheer existence, or in the 
case of Frankenstein, the sheer ugliness of an “Other” can function as a provocation. Eagleton 
mentions the Holocaust as an example:  
[T]he kind of others [the victims] who drive you [the evildoer] to mass murder are 
usually those who for some reason or other have come to signify the terrible non-being 
at the core of oneself. It is this aching absence which you seek to stuff with fetishes, 
moral ideals, fantasies of purity, the manic will, the absolute state, the phallic figure of 
the Führer. The obscene enjoyment of annihilating the Other becomes the only way of 
convincing yourself that you still exist. In this way, you demonstrate that you have 
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authority over the only antagonist – death – that cannot be vanquished even in principle. 
(100)  
For the Nazis, for example, the Jewish population came to represent every disgusting and 
impure aspect in the human race, concluding in the hubris that made them capable of murdering 
millions of human beings. For Victor Frankenstein, the creature might represent his own 
intolerable failure as a scientist or even an unfathomable challenge against the superiority of 
his own race. Kathleen Taylor states that extreme otherization often utilizes references to 
disgust and contamination (167), making the “disgusting” and “contagious” “Other” a 
justifiable subject to avoidance or even annihilation. Victor Frankenstein does not initially dare 
to destroy his creation physically: he is at first content in avoiding him and disregarding his 
existence. However, he does demonstrate callous cruelty in abandoning and rejecting him.  
After Frankenstein has managed to suppress all empathy towards his creature, his 
description of the “monster” is a prime example of dangerous, conscious otherization. As 
noted, Victor enters the creature’s hut claiming to feel compassion and a sense of duty towards 
his creature and wanting to learn the truth of his brother’s death. For six chapters, the course 
of a whole day, Frankenstein listens to the detailed history of his creature feeling intermittent 
compassion and “a wish to console him” (F 185). The creature provides him with ample 
information of his character and misfortunes. Even Frankenstein admits that the tale “proved 
[the “monster”] to be a creature of fine sensations” (F 184). The creature pleads with 
Frankenstein saying “...it is in your power to recompense me... let your compassion be moved, 
and do not disdain me” (F 125). Although the creature describes valid motives behind his 
crimes, Frankenstein, fuelled by his disgust towards the creature’s appearance, merely registers 
the confession: “The latter part of his tale had kindled anew in me the anger that had died away 
while he narrated his peaceful life among the cottagers” (F 182). Throughout the rest of 
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Shelley’s novel, Victor deliberately refuses to feel empathy towards the creature’s fine 
sensations and compassionate story.   
The most radical turn in Frankenstein’s opinions on the creature (from a miserable 
wretch to a malevolent fiend) happens in chapter 20. In the final hours of creating a female 
companion for his “monster”, Frankenstein falls back into the essence trap and contemplates: 
“Three years before, I was engaged in the same manner and had created a fiend whose 
unparalleled barbarity had desolated my heart and filled it forever with the bitterest remorse” 
(F 209, my italics). He ignores the original reason for his creature’s crimes (his abandonment) 
and the original reason for creating a companion for him (compassion). The creature’s pleas 
which at first raised a sense of duty in him are now described as “sophisms” that had moved 
him before and “fiendish threats” that had “struck [him] senseless” (F 210). Victor sees his 
creature watching the future companion through the window but claims that “as I looked on 
him, his countenance expressed the utmost extent of malice and treachery” (F 210). This 
indicates that Victor has ceased feeling empathy towards his creature who he now sees only as 
a malevolent “Other”.  
Otherization is a perhaps an explainable but nevertheless dangerous mindset since it 
might encourage violent behavior. Callousness and cruelty are traits that human beings grow 
accustomed and even numb to, which means that the cruelty of indifference grows into the 
cruelty of active violence (Taylor 183). On his deathbed, Frankenstein describes his motives 
for destroying “the Other” as follows:  
He showed unparalleled malignity and selfishness in evil; he destroyed my friends; he 
devoted to destruction beings who possessed exquisite sensations, happiness, and 
wisdom; nor do I know where this thirst for vengeance may end. Miserable himself that 
he may render no other wretched, he ought to die. The task of his destruction was mine, 
but I have failed. When actuated by selfish and vicious motives, I asked you to 
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undertake my unfinished work, and I renew this request now, when I am only induced 
by reason and virtue. (F 275)  
Terry Eagleton reminds us that evil is not some “alien power beyond us” or an “infecting toxic 
entity” but an ethical affair concerning human freedom and urges (126). This thought is 
supported by Baumeister who states that people do not need to be tempted by violence – to 
enable violent behavior one simply has to remove the social and cultural restraints (24).   
One method of removing restraints for violence is to perceive Others as definite threats. 
Victor Frankenstein decides to abort his mission of creating a mate for his creature allegedly 
in a fear of creating “a race of devils”; “a curse upon everlasting generations” (F 210). He 
destroys the being “on whose future existence” his creature “depended for happiness” (F 210–
211). As Victor tears his creature’s bride to pieces “trembling with passion”, “the wretch” sees 
everything “and with a howl of devilish despair and revenge” withdraws (F 201–211). Kathleen 
Taylor has stated that human cruelty is based on the disparity between symbolic threats and 
concrete physical danger (86). Taylor explains that perpetrators of cruel acts usually argue their 
case convincingly, justifying their actions with, for example, “otherizing stereotypes, false 
beliefs about the victim’s power and hostility, and strong emotions to motivate aggressive ‘self-
defence’” (Taylor 187). Victor Frankenstein believing that the creature and his companion 
would destroy the human race could represent such a false belief of power and hostility, 
considering that the creature himself vows to live a peaceful and secluded life with his mate. 
The belief of his creature’s dangerousness makes it possible for the “wretch” to evolve, in 
Victor Frankenstein’s assessment, into someone whose “soul is as hellish as his form, full of 
treachery and fiend-like malice” (F 264) and thus something that must be annihilated. 
Baumeister adds to Taylor’s theory stating that perpetrators often find their actions merely 
justifiable responses to the perceived attacks by their victims (Baumeister 25). Perpetrators thus 
feel that they are on the side of the good, defending from the bad (Baumeister 72). Victor 
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Frankenstein believes he is saving the world from his creature instead of violently and cruelly 
tearing apart his creature’s much awaited companion. A casual (or as Taylor would suggest, 
“callous”) approach to evil actions functions as a coping strategy making it possible for the 
perpetrators “to sleep at night” (Baumeister 21). It is his fear of the creature that keeps Victor 
Frankenstein awake at nights, not the act of destroying a being.  
From destroying the creature’s partner to the end of the novel, Frankenstein sees his 
creature as nothing but a malevolent devil, “a daemon whose delight is in death and 
wretchedness” (F 212). The “miserable wretch” has evolved to “a monstrous image” “with the 
mockery of a soul still more monstrous” (F 232). After the creature has had his revenge by 
killing Frankenstein’s bride, Victor has no other mission but to destroy him. The dramatic 
effects of Shelley’s novel follow the concept of “otherization as a continuum” (Taylor 8). 
Taylor quotes Raul Hilberg’s book The Destruction of the European Jews as an example of 
this: “The missionaries of Christianity had said in effect: You have no right to live among us 
as Jews. The secular rulers who followed had proclaimed: You have no right to live among us. 
The Nazis at last decreed: You have no right to live” (qtd. in Taylor 8). In the Second World 
War, the continuum pushed the Jewish population first into the ghettos, then to labor camps, 
then to destruction camps. In Shelley’s novel, published more than a hundred years prior to 
this, the creature is first avoided by distance and feared, then actively deprived of 
companionship and hope, then hunted to be killed.   
Victor’s violent endeavours to avoid and annihilate his creature are explicable as threat 
responses to some extent but the cognitive measures he takes to disregard the sympathetic side 
of his creature can be described as excessive. As mentioned before, evil is something that 
transcends normal behavior and takes a threat response to the extreme. In the case of Victor 
Frankenstein, his hatred towards his creature takes him across the world in an exhausting chase. 
It is difficult to offer a sufficient explanation why Frankenstein goes into such extremes in 
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loathing his creature as logically it would be less energy-consuming to coexist with him after 
the peace offer he makes. According to his own narration, Victor at times feels sympathy and 
even responsibility towards his creation but suppresses this natural urge for empathy. Does 
Victor Frankenstein cast away the possibility of a tranquil life (“on you it rests, whether I quit 
forever the neighbourhood of man and lead a harmless life...” {F 126}) because his pride does 
not tolerate ultimatums (“...or become the scourge of your fellow creatures and the author of 
your own speedy ruin” {F 126})? Or is the presumption of his creature’s malevolence too 
emotionally significant to be challenged? Admitting that his creature is not inevitably 
dangerous would invalidate the emotional and physical exhaustion he experienced in Ingolstadt 
when Henry Clerval nursed him back to his health – not to mention the grief he has endured 
because of his brother. Disregarding these ordeals would require him to admit his 
miscalculations and relinquish his emotional pain. To a solipsistic mind, this would be a serious 
task.  
Moral agency (the ability to make moral judgments about moral matters and to act on 
those judgements) is a widely discussed issue in critical posthumanism (Nayar 152). This is 
especially the case in bioethics when discussing the rights of the disabled, cyborgs, androids 
and clones (Nayar 152) – and the likes of Frankenstein’s creature. The issue is thus applicable 
also to Shelley’s Frankenstein. It is evident that Frankenstein’s creature is a moral being who 
acts not only through moral assessment but also through his emotions (Nayar 153). It is also 
evident that Victor Frankenstein has an enigmatic defect in moral thinking. Victor hence lacks 
a key feature of “personhood” (Nayar 2014) his creature possesses. This kind of moral 
deficiency (apparent also in Frankenstein’s crimes such as robbing graves, dissecting corpses 
and, according to his own words, torturing living animals) is not satisfyingly explainable by 
anything Victor Frankenstein has experienced according to his narration. Why does 
Frankenstein have such disdain towards the laws of God and men? Why does he refuse to 
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coexist with his own creature and admit his crimes? This mystery and uncertainty of Victor’s 
behavior resemble that of monstrosity. To some extent, one could argue that in his callous and 
solipsistic pride, unaffected by laws or moral codes, Victor Frankenstein actively and 
incomprehensibly challenges and threatens established norms – as monsters do.   
 
3.3. The Consequences of Evil in Shelley’s Frankenstein 
 
Kathleen Taylor defines human evil (which she prefers to call “cruelty”) as follows: “...cruelty 
is unjustified voluntary behavior which causes foreseeable suffering to an undeserving victim 
or victims” (29). It might well be added that a perpetrator is “at best indifferent to, at worst 
gratified by” this foreseeable suffering (Taylor 23). Although evil is usually perceived to 
consist of concrete acts of violence, Taylor emphasizes that it can also be presented as neglect 
or withholding of benefits (16). This type of cruel negligence is evident in Shelley’s 
Frankenstein when Victor abandons his “newborn” to the elements. When reunited with his 
creator, the creature recollects the first remembrances of his existence living in a forest near 
Ingolstadt: “...I lay by the side of a brook resting from my fatigue, until I felt tormented by 
hunger and thirst” (F 127). He continues: "It was dark when I awoke; I felt cold also, and half 
frightened, as it were, instinctively, finding myself so desolate… ...I was a poor, helpless, 
miserable wretch; I knew, and could distinguish, nothing; but feeling pain invade me on all 
sides, I sat down and wept.” (F 127–128) In his corpse-like appearance the creature might 
resemble a monster but in his desolation he resembles a frightened child which makes his 
abandonment a tragedy. The creature’s feelings of loneliness, hunger and fatigue later give 
room to more existential anguishes when he begins to study the relationships between human 
beings through the example of a loving family, the DeLanceys:  
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And what was I? Of my creation and creator I was absolutely ignorant, but I knew that 
I possessed no money, no friends, no kind of property. I was, besides, endued with a 
figure hideously deformed and loathsome; I was not even of the same nature as man... 
...When I looked around I saw and heard of none like me. Was I, then, a monster, a blot 
upon the earth, from which all men fled and whom all men disowned… ...I cannot 
describe to you the agony that these reflections inflicted upon me; I tried to dispel them, 
but sorrow only increased with knowledge. Oh, that I had forever remained in my native 
wood, nor known nor felt beyond the sensations of hunger, thirst, and heat! (F 150) 
His loneliness is emphasized by the contrast he detects between his life and those of the 
cottagers: the tender words and smiles of the cottagers are only meant for creatures like 
themselves, never for “the miserable, unhappy wretch” (F 151). He wonders about the 
existence of his own friends and relations observing that “[n]o father had watched my infant 
days, no mother had blessed me with smiles and caresses; or if they had, all my past life was 
now a blot, a blind vacancy in which I distinguished nothing” (F 151). His desperation worsens 
when he discovers his creator’s diary and learns the disgust Frankenstein felt towards him. The 
creature describes his feeling to Victor as follows: 
I sickened as I read. “Hateful day when I received life!” I exclaimed in agony. 
“Accursed creator! Why did you form a monster so hideous that even YOU turned from 
me in disgust? God, in pity, made man beautiful and alluring, after his own image; but 
my form is a filthy type of yours, more horrid even from the very resemblance. Satan 
had his companions, fellow devils, to admire and encourage him, but I am solitary and 
abhorred.” (F 164) 
After Victor Frankenstein has left his creature’s hut, the reader of Frankenstein is 
presented with no further narration from the creature’s point of view. Hence, the depictions of 
the creature’s suffering concern his initial abandonment – not the destruction of his bride, the 
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murders he commits or the chase he ensues with his creator. However, it is evident that Victor 
Frankenstein abandoning his creature and his pleas for a companion are cruel actions that result 
to significant amounts of suffering. It is also clear that the significant suffering caused by Victor 
is not limited to the creature alone. Earlier chapters in this thesis demonstrate some of the worry 
Victor’s friends and family members endure while he isolates himself as well as how 
Frankenstein’s failed diplomacy with the creature enable the murders of his little brother, 
closest friend and beloved bride and also the death sentence of a family friend. The 
consequences of Victor’s callous cruelty are enormous – monstrous, even.  
 In chapter 3.2. it was established that perpetrators of evil acts utilize numerous coping 
mechanisms to protect themselves from guilt. However, both theological and scientific 
approaches to evil demonstrate how perpetrators are often negatively impacted by their own 
actions. Terry Eagleton has stated that evil deeds have a way of returning to “plague the 
evildoer” with “unforeseeable effects” (33). Frankenstein himself agrees with this, stating: “[i]t 
is well for the unfortunate to be resigned, but for the guilty there is no peace. The agonies of 
remorse poison the luxury there is otherwise sometimes found in indulging the excess of grief” 
(F 241). Taylor uses a more scientific approach to the agonies of perpetrators, explaining that 
chronically activated and unnecessary long-lasting threat responses can damage the body while 
wasting energy and risking psychological harm (178). Taylor’s explanation correlates fluently 
with Frankenstein’s descriptions of his own downfall: “The human frame could no longer 
support the agonies that I endured, and I was carried out of the room in strong convulsions. A 
fever succeeded to this. I lay for two months on the point of death; my ravings, as I afterwards 
heard, were frightful; I called myself the murderer of William, of Justine, and of Clerval.” (F 
224) Frankenstein depicts to Captain Walton a long period of “an absorbing melancholy that 
resembled madness in its intensity and effects...” (F 192) and a “real insanity” that possesses 
him: “sometimes I was furious and burnt with rage, sometimes low and despondent. I neither 
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spoke nor looked at anyone, but sat motionless, bewildered by the multitude of miseries that 
overcame me.” (F 240)  
Besides experiencing physical and psychological symptoms, Frankenstein also 
describes his emotional sufferings in vivacious language and extensive amounts. After the 
creature is set loose, the narration begins to overflow with the descriptions of Victor’s “horrid 
anguish... ...such deep and bitter agony” (F 108), “hell of intense tortures such as no language 
can describe” (F 111), etc. Captain Walton also describes Frankenstein’s “violent feelings” and 
appearance of being “a slave of passion” “quelling the dark tyranny of despair” (F 30). After 
temporary moments of relief, Frankenstein continues to fall back to the “hell within [him] 
which nothing could extinguish” (F 109), sinking again “trembling and hopeless, into [his] 
miserable self” (F 203) and to a “gloomy and black melancholy that nothing could dissipate” 
(F 230). According to his narration he has become “the most miserable of mortals… 
...persecuted and tortured” (F 227) and is left wandering “like an evil spirit” for his “deeds of 
mischief beyond description horrible” (F 111). It is obvious that his evil deeds, for which he 
bears little responsibility, destruct his own life as well as his victims’.  
As stated earlier, evil is something that is conceivably present in every human being as 
well as something which can be explained to some extent. Many traits that enable evil acts, 
such as human neurobiology, childhood traumas, peer pressure or fear of “the Other” are so 
deep-seated within ourselves that there exists a moral dilemma in punishing evildoers rather 
than trying to rehabilitate them. Terry Eagleton repeatedly uses the term “damned” when 
talking about evildoers and suggests that they experience pain – to which they are willing to 
find a remedy even through extreme measures such as violence (103). He adds that, considering 
this pain, “even evil has a grisly kind of rationality about it” (103). To Eagleton, evildoers are 
not like those sadistic fictional characters who laugh maniacally at the destruction they have 
established: the evil are those who are “deficient in the art of living” (Eagleton 128). Shelley 
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offers an example of this kind of deficiency in Victor Frankenstein who is not content in 
admiring natural wonders but aims to destroy the sanctity and secrecy of them, suffering the 
consequences.  
After Frankenstein’s scientific failure, he does not find a replacing ambition but is left 
to wallow in the void left behind. The companionship of his friends and family are not enough 
to redeem his confidence since he has difficulty in connecting with other people. Simon Baron 
Cohen has contemplated on the issue whether or not people with limited capacity for empathy 
should be imprisoned if they commit a crime (160). Nonetheless, punishment sends a message 
to the social community, offers an opportunity for remorse and in some prison systems, an 
opportunity for rehabilitation (Baron Cohen 178). Baron Cohen himself supports the idea of 
rehabilitation and claims that some aspects of empathy, such as emotion recognition, can be 
assimilated by training (178). He also encourages sympathy for perpetrators, stating that living 
with a zero capacity for empathy can ultimately be lonely and risks being constantly 
misunderstood or even condemned as selfish (44). Instead of blaming someone for their evil 
deeds, it could be possible to teach them components of empathy. Roy F. Baumeister also 
mentions the aspect of addiction: the rush created by doing something forbidden may result in 
an inability to end such behavior (51). Some perpetrators of rape have claimed to have formed 
an addiction to the “forbidden pleasure” becoming unable to stop themselves from committing 
the crime (Baumeister 51). Where Taylor has attempted to explain evil through neuroscience, 
Baron Cohen through empathy erosion and Baumeister though addiction, Eagleton offers the 
Freudian death drive as an explanation: the suggestion that human beings unconsciously desire 
their own destruction (E108). Eagleton thus connects the theological urge for a meaningless 
void to psychoanalysis and states that a conflicted human being suffering from a struggle 
between his superego, the id and the external world understandably finds his own dissolution 
as a very tempting idea (E108). He concludes that if perpetrators are indeed mad and evil, it 
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makes them criminally not responsible and thus morally innocent: they should be cared for in 
psychiatric hospitals, not convicted (5).  
Trying to understand perpetrators has a connection with ending the circle of cruelty and 
the continuum of otherization as well as preventing the essence trap – something which the 
creature and creator fail to achieve in Shelley’s Frankenstein. The mutual hostility between 
these two characters demonstrate how evil could be diminished by abandoning the concepts of 
“an evil Other” and “a righteous self”, but is not. The duel thus indicate the complicated nature 
of perpetrators and victims, suggesting that “evil bad guys” and “heroic good guys” hardly ever 
exist in the actual world. Mary Shelley, in Frankenstein, depicts the deep and desperate voids 
of meaninglessness that ensue when otherization is taken too far. 
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4. Conclusion 
4.1. Why Are Fictional Monsters Necessary?  
 
The world has changed much since the time human beings had to be constantly vigilant against 
predators and other physical threats. Humans have found methods on how to shelter and defend 
themselves from beasts as well as how to communicate between different cultures. We have 
gained understanding of abnormal appearances both in animals and in human beings making 
the formerly monstrous-looking explainable. We have also begun to understand that the truly 
monstrous lies in unexplainable crimes. The cyclops, trolls and evil wizards have advanced 
from our superstitions to the world of cinema and literature. They no longer scare us but excite 
and entertain us. Even monsters resembling the ones from real life, such as serial killers and 
evil dictators, are recurring characters in fiction. Current monsters and evil creatures play a 
wholly different part in our lives than classic monsters did. 
 Kathleen Taylor claims that one reason people find fictional cruelty glamorous is the 
strong emotive power without the consequences: cruelty is a source of salient emotional 
experiences, and when cruel acts are connected to fictional and charismatic characters, the 
feeling of powerfulness without the aftermath is inherently interesting (214). Fictional heroes 
who destroy one-dimensional villains are considered fascinating, not disturbing (Taylor 215). 
Roy F. Baumeister has stated that in the postmodern culture there lies little shock value which 
inspires people to turn to what they imagine as evil: “vampires, mummies, zombies, rotting 
corpses, maniacal laughter, demoniac children, bleeding wallpaper, multicoloured vomit, and 
so on” (122). Baumeister, however, adds that such things are hardly evil, but “just plain nasty” 
(122). Fictional monsters would thus serve as an escape from the boring everyday life we live 
– with hardly any predators or natural catastrophes to make our hearts race. 
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Fictional monsters and villains also serve as a comparison to our own values. 
Monstrosity and monstrousness have never been objective but dictated qualities given to 
something queer and disturbing; they have also been a mirror to humanity and self (Wright 17). 
Michel Foucault has stated that “otherness is never just found encountered but always 
constructed” (qtd. in Wright 17). Caricatured villains with exaggerated tendencies towards 
sadism reassure audiences that evil people are a quite different from ourselves as well as easy 
to recognize and punish (Taylor 215). If a sadistic villain faces a violent and sadistic end, we 
find it gratifying (Taylor 215). The immunity or “plot armor” the hero is usually granted gives 
audiences a sense of security: whatever horrible things happen around us, the point-of-view 
character (resembling ourselves) remains untouched (Taylor 216). The audiences can feel 
gratified by the notion of one’s own righteousness compared to the villain – as well as by the 
notion of one’s own safety as no wicked deed is left unpunished.   
Villains and monsters are not only an alien force to be avoided and annihilated. They 
also provide perspectives to our own selves. Literature critics such as Foust have studied the 
Freudian theories of doppelgängers and the terrifying reflection of self, which in fantasy 
literature has often been utilized as the antagonist: “the Other” represents something familiar 
but abandoned, alienated from the self (para. 4). At the same time, monsters and villains are a 
terrifying and entertaining force of literature and cinema, at the same time they can act as a 
creative force enabling new perspectives on laws, limits and social structures as well as on 
human understanding, values and belief systems (see Wright 2013). By defining what is 
monstrous and evil, we define what is forbidden. Monstrosity and evil can thus be seen both as 
a method for humans to feel better about themselves and seclude unwanted features to 
monstrous beings – or as a reflector for improving and understanding our inner workings. Most 
importantly, monstrosity can help people understand the potential to evil acts in every human 
being which makes it more possible to prevent evil from actualizing.  
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 Authors such as Baumeister, Cohen, Eagleton, Taylor and Wright have studied the 
concepts of monstrosity, evil and cruelty from the understanding perspective claiming that 
these concepts are not mysterious or incomprehensible. On the contrary, understanding the 
concepts might help to resolve the circle of cruelty, the continuum of otherization and the 
essence trap. Fictional monsters and villains have throughout centuries entertained the bored 
mind, helped to exclude unwanted attributes from ourselves and helped to understand our own 
monstrosity. Perhaps the next step would be for the monsters and villains to help audiences 
understand and “dedemonize” “the Other” – to condemn the crime but understand the criminal. 
 
4.2. The Relevance of Evil, Cruelty and Monstrosity in Shelley’s Frankenstein  
 
Otherization, the essence trap and callous cruelty are crucial elements in Mary Shelley’s 
Frankenstein. This makes the novel, written over two hundred years ago by the then 19-year-
old Shelley, a very current piece of literature. Instances and consequences of cruelty as well as 
otherization are visible in the news daily. Political discourse also utilizes otherizing 
terminology, feeding the fears of the listener and offering seemingly effective solutions to 
complex issues (Taylor 150). However, otherization as a problem-solving method has a long 
history of failure, especially when compared to the methods of many modern societies where 
the potential of cooperation, negotiation and compromise can limit conflict (Taylor 242). 
Kathleen Taylor claims that much of cruelty stems from the need to feel powerful and 
authoritative – leaving diplomacy in the background because of ego, ignorance, lazy thinking 
and the instant gratification of a power rush (242). Diplomacy can, however, be learned through 
education, reducing false beliefs and questioning those who have something to gain from 
otherization (Taylor 243). Critical posthumanism has already begun to criticize human 
tendencies to define themselves against the deformed and seemingly monstrous and marking 
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artificial boundaries between human and nonhuman features as well as dominating the less 
valued lifeforms (Nayar 110). Fictional narratives such as Shelley’s Frankenstein may help in 
addressing these issues. 
One method of adjusting our mindset against otherization might be to make critical 
reassessments of misunderstood fictional antagonists such as Shelley’s “the creature” as well 
as falsely esteemed protagonists such as Victor Frankenstein. It is very human to fear the 
visually disturbing and different, but the notion of the creature’s monstrosity is an 
outstandingly fixed one also because of his presentation in many popular films and TV 
adaptations (e.g. Frankenstein, 1931). However, a better understanding of Victor Frankenstein 
and his creature might help audiences understand otherization and the essence trap in a real life 
context as well – much like the feminist readings of Star Wars or Twilight might adjust our 
views of appropriate romantic advances. A close reading of the Moomin books might promote 
empathy against the socially excluded members of our society. A close reading of Frankenstein 
might adjust our views on “the Other” in a way that promotes empathy and diminishes cruelty 
based on ignorance or pride.  
In the 19th century context there was no opportunity for “the monster” to fit in the 
natural order but as science and understanding of different cultures, appearances and behavioral 
dysfunctions evolve, so does the reader's capacity to sympathize with different kinds of 
creatures. It is easy to surrender to the prejudiced fear of Victor Frankenstein instead of 
recognizing the point of view of “the Other”. The creature however proves himself a peace-
seeking, intelligent and adaptive being whereas his creator is the one who lacks empathy, 
listening skills and adaptiveness, maintaining his steadfast attitude despite better knowledge. 
The consequences of his narrow-mindedness are brutal. 
In our world where cultures clash violently and wars become more and more global, 
Shelley’s novel is a very current piece of literature, showing the detrimental consequences of 
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excessive pride, narrow-mindedness and even ethnocentrism which can lead to otherization 
and cruelty. Perhaps future generations with a better understanding of otherization and empathy 
read Shelley’s classic novel as a psychological drama of a racist creator abandoning his 
creation. When referring to “the Frankenstein monster” they might not refer to the creature, but 
to Victor – the prideful scientist who attempts to challenge the monopoly on the sacred but 
creates a void of meaninglessness instead. 
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